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ABSTRACT
This quantitative study explores the impact of overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage,
and co-operation (or non-cooperation) among 29 highly experienced private equity fund and
investment managers. Using four structured experiments, M&A professionals were assigned
buyer and seller roles and allowed to choose among investment opportunities. Within a game
theory framework, the buyers and sellers bargained over the purchase price. The results of these
experiments were explored using a linear regression format. The skill level of the participants
was measured using a financial literacy test prior to the experiments and two overconfidence
measures were constructed. Lying for strategic advantage was an embedded behavior, and cooperation versus non-cooperation was observed. Results suggest that more experienced buyers,
along with more skilled buyers, were able to achieve a lower price paid and higher ROI. Lying
for strategic advantage was not found to have an impact on the price paid by buyers. Cooperation
was not found to have a statistically significant impact. However, results suggest that when lying
and cooperation is employed by a buyer, they can achieve a lower price paid for an acquisition,
thus a higher ROI. These findings contribute to our understanding of outcomes observed from
private equity transactions.

Keywords: Overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, cooperation, non-cooperation
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview
Human behavioral interaction during investment decision-making embedded in game
theory structured experiments provides an excellent contextual framework for insight into
strategic human behavioral interaction during the negotiation of a private company acquisition
transaction. In an experimental setting, indigenous factors such as the potentially significant
economic outcomes for one or multiple participants bias behavior(s) can be isolated, observed,
and recorded. In this context, a framing effect occurs because financial decisions involve clear
incentives (Beckman & Menkhoff, 2008). The operating assumption of behavioral economics is
that cognitive biases (see Appendix C for a Glossary of Terms) often prevent people from making
rational decisions, despite their best efforts (Ariely, 2009).
Nash (1950, 1951) suggested two game theory approaches to resolve bargaining
problems: axiomatic and strategic. The axiomatic approach is indicative of the cooperative
strategy in negotiations. In contrast, the strategic approach depicts outcomes, such as a
noncooperative game in a merger or acquisition (M&A) transaction (Rubenstein, 1987). Nash
(1953) surmises the second approach to bargaining as the non-cooperative, dominant strategic
strategy. This stratagem entails a lack of cooperative sharing of vital decision-making
information. Specifically, the dominant strategic strategy is exemplified in a context in which the
dominant players possess information that gives them an advantage. Crawford (2003) refers to
this framework as a type of zero-sum or noncooperative game in which there is only one winner.
An example is in American football, in which each team seeks to win and does not cooperate by
sharing their strategy.
Bargaining theory is the branch of game theory dealing with the analysis of bargaining
problems, in which the participants negotiate over the division of some economic benefit or
1

goods ending in an enforceable agreement between the participants (Kuhn & Harsanyi, 1995).
Nash (1950) defined it as “a solution to a bargaining problem means determining a division of
the economic benefit or interests” (p. 1). In addition, Nash (1950) developed cooperative
theories, such as two-person collaborative or interest-based negotiation, that involves the parties
in an effort to meet each other’s needs and satisfy interests jointly. Thus, the outcome to the
bargaining is of mutual benefit. Nash (1950) refers to these outcomes as nonzero-sum games.
Crawford (1982) stated that “the common belief is that inefficient outcomes are consistent with
rational behavior by well-informed bargainers” (p. 608).
This research concentrated on two-person cooperation games by isolating three human
cognitive behaviors: overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage, and
cooperation/noncooperation. This research examines their potential impacts on the economic
outcome from the buyer participants’ vantage point.
Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to consider themselves above average on
positive characteristics (Alicke, 1995; Kruger, 1999). Overconfident decisions often indicate a
loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one’s own competence or capabilities,
especially when the person exhibiting it is in a position of power. In this research,
overconfidence is defined as the difference between the participant’s belief in their competence
abilities in M&A negotiations, their experience, and their actual competency. Performance will
be measured as Return on Investment (ROI) on investment or over/under payment for purchase.
Ariely (2008) states that, in general, anything that causes emotion (e.g., sexual arousal,
hunger, anger, compassion) can lead to irrational behavior. Emotions are inherently nonrational.
The reasons we lie boils down to two principal objectives: to prevent something we find
undesirable from happening or to help us secure something we find desirable but anticipate

2

that we will not succeed in getting if we are honest about things. Crawford (2001) posited that
lying for strategic advantage about planned actions, or intentions, is a common feature of
economic and political as well as military life. Such lying frequently takes the form of active
misrepresentation, as opposed to less than full, honest disclosure.
Co-operation is the deviation from self-interest where individuals show regard for others
well-being, fairness principles, or a general willingness to empathize. Communication collusion
in resolving a coordinated problem. For example, consider a free and open share of transaction
information between buyers and sellers such that equilibrium is achieved in expectation and
economic outcome. In this instance, co-operation is a nominal behavioral action. This contrasts
with non-cooperation, during which binary economic events with financial stakes an individual
maintains his personal self-interest above other individuals without showing regard for others
well-being, disavowing fairness principles, and exhibiting general unwillingness to empathize.
Problem Addressed
The primary problem addressed in this study is: does behaviors of a buyer, manifested as
overconfidence and cognitive behaviors that are exemplified by lying for strategic advantage and
cooperation/noncooperation by private equity and investment fund managers (Wang et al., 2018),
each have an economic impact on the purchase price and ROI for the acquisition of a private
company?
The impact of overconfidence bias behavior has been previously examined for CEOs of
publicly traded companies, stockbroker’s trading habits (Trinugroho & Sutami, 2011), and
empirical examination of company sales via Dutch auctions by researchers in economics and
behavioral finance (Bennett et al., 2020). In contrast, game theorists have investigated dishonesty
and misrepresentation of the facts or circumstances (i.e., cheap talk) in communication, referred
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to as signals (i.e., mis-direction), using university students in laboratory experiments to examine
strategic advantage in lying and withholding information and cooperation versus noncooperation
(Charness, 2000; Crawford et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2002).
From this study, practitioners and researchers can better understand that private equity
and investment fund managers (buyers) do not benefit from exhibiting overconfidence bias and
better-than-average (BtA) behavior in their investment (financial) interaction in decision-making.
This study also found that they are not significant predictors of their impact on ROI or the
premium price paid for by buyers in the acquisition of a private company. Further, skill level and
years of work experience significantly predicted the premium price paid by buyers.
Interaction (between lying and cooperation) was a significant predictor of the premium
price paid by buyers. For every one-unit increase of interaction, there is a corresponding $1,220,000 decrease in the premium price paid. If you doubt that lying can be beneficial, Gneezy
et al. (2011) suggested "a lie can harm the liar but help the other person, referring to these
"altruistic white lies" and that "the consequences of black lies where the liar benefits at the
expense of the others are likely to have very different distributional concerns compared to the
consequences of white lies where both parties benefit" (p. 2).
Much information is available in repositories such as PitchBook, Bureau Van Dijk, and
Dealogic regarding CEOs paying premium prices for public company M&A. An example is
KKR's sale of The Bountiful Company to Nestle in April 2021 for $5.75 billion. KKR's financial
basis in the company was $4 billion. Thus, the premium to market paid was more than 40%.
According to Moeller at al. (2004), the average premium paid for United States public
acquisitions between 1980 and 2001 was 68% for large companies.
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Latham and Watkins' M&A lawyers reported that the market is driven by private and
public M&A transactions. However, private M&A is more prevalent because there are more
private companies than public companies (Katz et al., 2021). The ready availability of financing
is the driving factor, particularly for a private company and private equity firms’ deal-making,
for which acquirer stock is not available as transaction consideration (Katz et al., 2021). “While
corporate buyers may share operational synergies with the target firm, financial buyers rely
primarily on improving the stand-alone value of the target firm or buying undervalued assets”
(Dittmar & Li, 2011, p. 1). “Moreover, financial buyers face shorter investment horizons than
corporate buyers and incentivize target management differently” (Roosenboom & Fidrmuc,
2009, p. 15).
Pikulina and Rennenboog (2017), whose paper I modeled this dissertation’s research
framework after, posited that “the lack of researcher collaboration concerning the relationship
between overconfidence and investment could be explained by practical difficulties, such as an
appropriate reference point or a person’s ability. Thus, challenges exist when identifying whether
an individual overestimates or underestimates their skills” (p. 2). In real-world situations,
assessing individuals’ degree of overconfidence and cognitive bias behaviors is problematic,
including determining who is overconfident amongst the private equity fund managers and how
robust their level of overconfidence is. It should be noted that Pikulina and Renneboog (2017)
use the measure of financial knowledge, skill level, and investment risk to investigate
overconfidence.
Game theory structured experimental simulations of financial transactions are of
significant value to game theory research, as they allow for the isolation of the effect of a
particular bias on individual behavior by buyers and sellers. Moreover, according to Friedman
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and Sunder (1994), experimental data are relatively easy to interpret. Biais et al. (2009)
suggested that “the study of controlled environments allows more confident inferences about
cause and effect” (p. 17). An experimental setting supports overcoming several problems by
communicating contextual information to the participants, such as fundamental asset value,
expected dividends on an asset over a specified period, terminal value (multiples on earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, also known as EBITDA), and discount
rates for calculating the present value. These components are controllable in a game theory
structured experiment, creating favorable conditions for observing subjects’ behavioral
interaction during events with a potentially significant economic outcome to each participant and
allowing the researcher to extrapolate to a larger representative population.
The first aim of this research was to construct a comprehensive measure of private equity
fund managers and investment managers' (buyers) overconfident bias and cognitive bias using
their Calibration Based Overconfidence (CBO) score and BtA scores. The use of these
confidence measurements provided a foundation for examining how cognitive bias and
boundedly rational behaviors, (e.g., lying for strategic advantage, noncooperation and
cooperation) impact the purchase price premium paid and the ROI for the acquisition of a
privately held company, the dependent variables (DVs) of this study.
In psychology, a cognitive bias is a phenomenon underlying irrational decisions, which is
a mistake in reasoning, evaluating, remembering, or other cognitive processes. Cognitive bias
often results from maintaining personal preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary
information. “Alternatively, rational behavior is often explicitly defined as analytical, logical,
and conscious” (Dane et al., 2011, p. 4).
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Pikulina and Renneboog (2017) define overconfidence as “the difference between
persons' belief about their competence in the financial domain and their abilities” (p. 1). An
example of this (using this study’s context) would be a participant overestimating their
competencies and experiences in M&A negotiations versus objective measures of their
competency, such as performance-based ROI or whether a premium price was paid for
purchasing the private company. For this study, the following constructs (variables) of behavior
are utilized: (1) lying for strategic advantage and (2) cooperation versus non-cooperation and the
interaction between the two amongst participants during human interaction during negotiations
and decision-making for the acquisitions because of their being used as a strategy tool by buyers
and seller. Thus, the need to investigate their impacts in the premium price paid and ROI when
acquiring a privately held company.
The two overconfidence measurements examined for this study were derived from
researchers who used particular methods, or factors of interest, and did not combine several
approaches to ascertain a more precise measurement. A few of the noteworthy methods that were
used together included a financial knowledge test, a determination of skill level score (Pikulina
& Renneboog, 2017), a CBO score that is a calibration-based measure (Michailova, 2010), and a
BtA score (Alicke, 2005). Ultimately, measures of CBO score, skill level, and BtA were selected
as the predictor variables for testing their respective impact on the DVs, the premium price paid,
and ROI because of their relevance.
The CBO score is operationalized as the difference between a participant’s average
confidence in their responses and the actual reported number of correct answers to the 20question financial knowledge test. The BtA or “is defined as the participant’s assessment of their
financial knowledge and abilities as being better than their peers in the sample group” (Alicke,
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2005, p. 85). Finally, skill level is based on the percentage range of the participant’s correct
answers to the financial knowledge test. Skill level was calculated by how the participants
performed on the financial knowledge test and the ROI achieved on their respective acquisition
transaction relative to their skill level. An example of skill level assessment can be in a
participant’s overestimation and over-placement refer to the inclination of a participant in the
experiments conducted to overestimate their performance on the financial knowledge test and
how they perceive their performance compared to their peers and their taking higher risk than
their skill level and capabilities.
The experimental methodology was sequentially deployed and enabled me to assess the
participants’ financial knowledge as performance-based measures of their CBO score and
whether they perceived themselves as being BtA when undertaking an investment decision.
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) posited that “these effects extend to economic decision-making in
experiments” (p. 307).
“Overconfidence also relates to the agency problem” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 10).
A significant body of literature supports agency theory as responsible for private equity and
investment managers driving their fees and transaction remuneration by employing limited
information sharing with sellers and their limited partners (Appelbaum & Batt, 2016; Eisenhardt,
1989; Jensen, 1986; Sapienza, 2000). For example, Appelbaum and Batt (2016) described fee
churning and nondisclosure of fees charged (e.g., monitoring charges, charging back-office fees
that should be part of management fees, failure to share monitoring fees with limited partners,
charging an M&A broker fee for each acquisition transaction, and sharing fees with third-party
consultants contracted to provide due diligence services). The relevance here is that often private
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equity and investment firms will engage in acquisitions to earn fees unnecessarily at the cost of a
reasonable yield to their limited partner investors.
I investigated the impact of private equity and investment fund managers’ (buyers)
overconfidence behavior and cognitive bias behaviors and their impact on financial events such
as a company acquisition or sales with an economic outcome by conducting a series of
experiments designed to simulate various levels of transactional risk and economic reward in
private company acquisition settings to address the following research questions:
1. How does a private equity or investment fund manager’s (buyer’s) bias behavior
impact the purchase price premium paid in a merger or acquisition transaction for a
private company?
2. Can the buyer’s employment of strategies such as: lying for strategic advantage and
co-operation versus non-cooperation during negotiations be used tactically by a
private equity and investment fund manager (buyers) to diminish the seller’s price
expectations in an acquisition transaction private company?
The first construct that I tested was with CBO score, skill level, and years of work
experience as IVs and premium price paid as the DV. Although the model was not a good fit, it
was found that both skill level (p = .02) and years of work experience (p = .01) were significant
predictors of premium paid price. Both had a negative relationship with the premium price paid.
In this regression, the confidence measure examined was CBO score. The skill measurement
investigated was the aforementioned skills level score.
The second regression model was with BtA, skill level, and work experience as IVs and
premium price paid as the DV. The regression model was found not to be a good fit for the data;
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however, it was found that both skill level (p = .02) and years of work experience (p = .01) are
significant predictors of premium paid the price.
For this study, I chose to focus on two primary measures of overconfidence (i.e., CBO
and BtA) and the performance-based measure skill level. The data collection methods were used
to ascertain whether a private equity and investment fund manager’s overconfident bias behavior
during the negotiation interactions increased the probability of this behavior impacting the
purchase price.
The study’s findings showed that among the private equity and investment fund manager
(buyers) who were participants (n = 16), there was: 1) skill level was a significant predictor of
the premium price paid. An increase in skill level would have a corresponding decrease in the
premium price paid, 2) years of work experience was a significant predictor of the premium price
paid. An increase in years of work experience would have a corresponding decrease in the
premium price paid, and 3) CBO score and BtA were not significant predictors of either
premium price paid or ROI.
The traditional argument among academics is that “there is no conventional method of
overconfidence measurement for financial and economic experiments” (Malmendier & Tate,
2004, p. 13). Examples of how researchers approached the issue include Malmendier and Tate’s
(2004) use of empirical data from Forbes 500 firms, Dhir and Mital’s (2012) as well as Dionne
and Le Haye's (2015) use of proxies from game theory, historical data from public auctions,
specifically designed tests, and tasks applied by other researchers.
Does it matter that the prior researchers focused on public companies because of the
availability of data? Yes. I posit that these prior studies were conducted explicitly using publicly
traded company data that often do not provide the full picture of findings relevant to private
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equity M&A professional practitioners. Why? Specifically, because data points to the fact that
more than 70% of the M&A in the United States are for the purchase of private companies by
private investors, private equity firms, investment managers or buyers/operators whose
acquisition costs often are below $100 million dollars and not reported (Katz et al., 2021).
In addition to the four experiments used in the study being designed specifically to assess
the impact of the predictor variables, the experiments also compared the participants’
performance-based measurements (financial knowledge and skill) while considering the
participants’ perceptions of their skill and capabilities and their investment choice of risk taken,
which is characteristic of optimism bias. Optimism bias is defined as overestimation of abilities,
achievement, abilities and or success to be higher than actual (Pakulina, 2017). Thus, I sought to
isolate the drivers underlying the behaviors related to paying premium prices and ROI in
acquiring private companies.
The current study differs from Malmendier and Tate’s (2004) approach of employing a
historical data set from 1980 to 1994. Malmendier and Tate (2004) investigated whether CEOs
decided to convert personal stock options because of their confidence in their leadership ability.
They identified overconfidence as when the CEOs failed to exercise their stock options when
they were at the threshold of ‘in the money’ or held the options longer because of their
overconfidence in their leadership abilities. It is my opinion that solely using publicly traded
company CEO data skews the ability to make an inference to CEOs of private companies,
knowing that the latter constitute a larger amount of the M&A transactions conducted in the U.S.
This study employed four simulated business acquisition transactions in experiments,
which included various levels of transactional risk and economic reward embedded in the
construct described above. Using these experiments, I accumulated data on performance, ability,
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risk taken, and behavior interaction. The current interest of the investment firms, bankers, and
Wall Street brokerage houses motivated Jiang (2016) and Dittmar (2011) to investigate why
private equity and investment fund managers (buyers) pay lower prices for acquisitions than
corporate CEOs. This question led Doukas and Petmezas (2007) to analyze managers’
overconfidence behavior in M&A and examine how individual-level overconfidence behavior
results in higher prices and investment aggressiveness when investment fund managers
incorporate incomplete information into their game and thus drive their psychological pricing.
Kose and Liu (2010) analyzed and demonstrated the impact of CEO overconfidence and the
behavioral bias interaction on the acquisition premium paid in 1,890 public company M&A
transactions between 1993 and 2005. Bargeron et al.’s (2008) findings clarified the distinction
between private equity and investment fund managers and public company CEOs. The incentives
are higher for private equity firm managers for several reasons, including: “(a) most transactions
are cash deals; (b) these (public) CEOs pay a considerable difference in purchase premiums; (c)
synergy gains by acquisitions made by private equity firms are less motivating, but that target
firms’ shareholders earn 63% higher premiums if a public company buys their company”
(Bargeron, 2008, p. 390).
I tested a second construct to examine whether lying for strategic advantage impacted the
buyers’ economic outcome, the premium price paid, and acquisition negotiations. Ariely (2008)
makes the case that people lie for two principal objectives: a) to prevent something we find
undesirable from happening or b) to help secure something desirable but unobtainable if
remaining honest. Crawford (200) posited that “lying for strategic advantage about planned
actions or intentions is a common feature of economic, political, and military life. Such lying
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frequently takes the form of active misrepresentation instead of less than completely honest
disclosure” (p. 2).
The first regression model developed to test hypothesis 2 was for buyers only using lying
for strategic advantage, skill level, and years of work experience as the IVs and premium price
paid as the DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 5.20, p =
.024, with an adjusted R2 of .493. It was found that both skill level (p = .007) and years of work
experience (p = .004) are significant predictors of premium paid the price among buyers. Lying
for strategic advantage was found to not be a significant predictor of a buyer paying a premium
price or for ROI for the acquisition of a private company. As an aside, lying for strategic
advantage was measured by empirical observation by reviewing the video recordings
(Omwuegbuzie et al., 2009) of the four experiments and noting the number of times that the
buyers and sellers misrepresented the pertinent financial achievement and operational facts that
the buyer or seller failed to disclose or make full and honest disclosure of (Crawford, 2001).
The third construct that I examined was the impact of noncooperation versus cooperation
on the economic outcome of the sale of a private company. Premium price paid (buyers and
sellers) and ROI were used as the specified acquisition transactions in which this behavior was
embedded with the companies' sellers. Noncooperation was defined as during binary economic
events with financial stakes, an individual maintains his self-interest above other individuals
without showing regard for others' well-being, disavowing fairness principles, and exhibiting
complete general unwillingness to empathize. Cooperation/noncooperation was measured by
empirical observation by reviewing the video recordings of the four experiments and noting the
number of times that the buyers and sellers did or did not share pertinent financial achievement
and operational facts that the buyer or seller failed to disclose, thus either enabling or disabling
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equilibrium between the buyers and the seller. The sellers in the experiments were instructed by
being provided written overview of each of their roles and the tenets of the transaction’s
economics. From this perspective, I concluded that noncooperation is a nominal behavior action.
Nash (1950) clarified the term cooperation by stating that "cooperation implies that the players
(buyers and sellers) have complete freedom of communication of information and complete
information on the structure of the game" (p. 151). Nash (1950) further posited that "either player
may secure a commitment (enforced contract) upon himself if he desires" (p. 152). Fudenberg et
al. (2012) concluded that “cooperative strategies yield higher payoffs than noncooperative
strategies in treatments with cooperative equilibria” (p. 720).
The first regression model developed to test hypothesis 3 was for buyers using
cooperation/non-cooperation, skill level, and years of work experience as the IVs and premium
price paid as the DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F (3,10) =
4.31, p = .034, with an adjusted R2 of .433. It was found that both skill level (p = .015) and years
of work experience (p = .007) were significant predictors of premium paid price among buyers.
Both had a negative relationship with the premium price paid. For every one-unit increase of
skill level, there was a corresponding –$9,340,000 decrease in the premium price paid. This was
in contrast to every one-unit increase of years of work experience, which resulted in a
corresponding -$1,433,805 decrease in the premium price paid. The findings for all 16 buyer
participants were that the noncooperative strategy was inferior to cooperation during
negotiations. In other words, cooperation was not statistically significant. When buyers
cooperated, they paid a lower premium price and had a higher ROI.
A second regression model was run for buyers only with interaction (between lying and
cooperation), skill level, and years of work experience as the IVs and premium price paid as the
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DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 7.05, p = .008, with
an adjusted R2 of .583. It was found that interact (p = .045), skill level (p = .002), and years of
work experience (p = .001) are significant predictors of the premium paid the price paid amongst
the buyers.
In addition to examining the buyers’ non-cooperative behavior in the four experiments, I
observed the games (experiments) live and recorded notes when cooperation occurred and by
whom. I detected that older, more experienced M&A practitioners, and females (buyers)
exercised their cooperation by sharing information on their transactions more readily, whether
they were buyers or sellers.
Investment Decision-Making
The process of M&A can be allocated across three functions: “the self-evaluation of the
target enterprise, an assessment of the value of the target enterprise by the buyer, and the game
process played between the buyer and seller for the purchase/sale of the targeted private
company” (Jiang & Zhang, 2016, p. 22). My proposition was consistent with Bergeron’s (2008)
notion that private equity and investment fund managers (buyers) do not overpay for private
company acquisitions because they are more selective in the price and willing to pay for their
target acquisition than public company CEOs. Dittmar and Li (2011) found that financial buyers
pick have superior skills in identifying targets and negotiating good deals and that the key
determinants or the difference in premiums paid is the target’s high potential for value
improvement based upon information not available publicly.
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Significance of the Proposed Research
I found that the strategies which may be employed by private equity and investment fund
managers each have little utility of in achieving their desired goal of maximizing their ROI and
decreasing the premium price paid for the acquisition of a private company.
The significance of this study is that prior studies have focused on the overconfidence of
the CEOs of public companies and their stock trader's mentality (CEOs whom are driven to
pursue M&A in an attempt to drive the stock price up). In this regard, public CEOs pay more
attention to remuneration than the day-to-day operations of the business. Malmendier and Tate
(2005) considered CEOs who overestimate the future return of their companies measured by
failure to divest company specific risk on their personal accounts. They examine overconfident
CEOs who defer the exercise of their stock options and infer his overconfidence in his to keep
the stock price rising because he wants to profit from expected price increases. Smit and Moraitis
(2010) examined the Vodaphone acquisitions teams' judgment biases. Other scholars have
examined cognitive bias and irrational behavior in a game theory context but with student
participants (e.g., Agarwal, 2011). At the time of this study, no researchers have published
results concerning the premium prices paid for private companies resulting from the impact of a
private equity fund manager’s overconfidence bias and cognitive bias behavior.
Limitations
The primary limitation of this study was the ability to recruit an adequate sample size.
The pre-study estimation suggested that a sample size of 60 participants could provide sufficient
power for statistical tests. After consulting a statistics advisor and using the study criteria for
knowledgeable participants, I chose a purposefully selected non-probable sample of 32 M&A
professionals.
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Implications
The outcomes from this study fill a void in the existing literature and provide new
knowledge to private equity firms investment managers, investment funds managers, and private
M&A professionals by enabling them with strategies to control the impact of overconfidence
bias and cognitive bias behaviors on the premium price paid for a private target company. In
addition, the results provide factual evidence and inferential statistics that support hypothesis # 3
that these cognitive behaviors impact private company sale prices. The remainder of this study is
organized as follows: Chapter 2 consists of a literature review, Chapter 3 contains the data
collection methods and instruments, Chapter 4 includes the measurements and data analytics, and
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the results and implications.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical frameworks start with investigating the relationship between variables and
evaluating existing theories to build a blueprint for a dissertation inquiry (Miles et al., 2014). I
chose a thematic approach to write the literature review for this study. Thus, this literature
review was organized by theme or category, which is by the IVs. The thematic structures that I
examined were: 1) patterns in the literature that are more pronounced than others, 2) central
themes, and 3) evidence of these themes.
Two exiting theories that underpin the foundation of this research are derived from Nash
(1950). Essentially, bargaining theory is the branch of game theory dealing with the analysis of
bargaining problems, in which the participants bargain over the division of some economic
benefit or goods. Nash (1950) posits that “a solution to a bargaining problem means determining
a division of the economic benefit or interests” (p. 155). Nash (1950) developed co-operative
theories such as two-person collaborative or interest-based negotiation that involves the parties to
meet each other’s needs and satisfy interests jointly. Thus, the outcome is of mutual benefit.
Nash (1950) refers to these outcomes as non-zero-sum games. The four experiments developed
for this paper are relevant as they each provide the investigative vehicle of the two-person
bargaining process over an economic outcome, namely the $1500 reward for the highest ROI.
Nash (1950) developed four axioms that are relevant to all bargaining solutions:
1. Any solution should be invariant under positive linear transformations of the
utility function.
2. The solution should be efficient in the sense of Pareto optimality.
3. Irrelevant alternatives should not change the outcome of the solution.
4. Bargaining problems with symmetric outcomes should have symmetric solutions.
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The axioms relevance to this paper are that "if these conditions are satisfied, then there is
a unique solution, namely, the outcome that maximizes the product of the other players' utilities”
(Nash, 1950, p. 155). Thus, if these conditions are satisfied amongst the participants in the four
experiments conducted for this research, then the outcome should be beneficial to participants.
Hypotheses Development and Rationale
These four axiomatic frameworks of Nash (1950) offered a constructive methodology for
gaining insight into private equity fund and investment fund manager's (financial buyers)
cognitive bias behavioral motivations, personality traits, and their negotiation interaction
behavior during decision-making for a M&A transaction for privately held companies in
experimental settings. I purposefully developed the experiments to examine these human
interactions more closely. At this juncture, a road map was needed in which to focus on literary
works that complimented the hypotheses and the rationale for this study. The following questions
arose when considering these four axioms in the context of private equity and investment fund
managers’ investment (acquisition) decision-making:
•

How does the buyer’s overconfidence impact decision-making in M&A?

•

What overconfidence biases are manifested in the M&A process?

•

How do you measure overconfidence in private equity and investment fund managers?

•

What theories of overconfidence measurement are valid and what are not?

•

Does lying for strategic advantage impact the economic outcome in a private company
transaction?

•

How does noncooperation impact the buyer’s economic outcome in a private company
acquisition?

Behavior Impacting on Decision-Making in M&A
Gaughan (2002) posits that there are three main goals: “first, expansion, which is
typically caused by the need for rapid growth. Second, the creation of synergies such as
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combining business lines of products that complement one another. Third, financial factors, such
as undervaluing the asset or tax incentives” (p. 8). Financials factor could include a CEO’s
motivation to acquire or merge with another company to drive his company’s stock price up to
increase impact upon the value of his stock options. The three of these goals or motivations lead
to an expected economic outcome or benefit for the buyers and sellers and give impetus to their
pursuing them (Motis, 2007).
Bradley et al. (1988) and Dyer (2004) suggested that the value of a new combined entity
is greater than the sum of its previously separate values. Another motivation or goal is derived
from agency issues between managers and shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen (1986)
proposed that managers may rationally pursue their objectives at the expense of shareholders'
interests. Roll (1986) offered an alternative motive for undertaking acquisitions is managerial
hubris. Alternatively, Jensen (1986) advocates that disgorging cash from a company’s balance
sheet will hobble a CEO's acquisitive instincts. Roll (1986) suggested the hubris hypothesis, or
that managers of acquiring firms make valuation errors because they are too optimistic about the
potential of combined synergies in a buyout or merger. As a result, managers often overbid a
target company to the detriment of their firm's investors.
These themes segue into the literature review of research conducted by other authors on
the IVs of this study (i.e., overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage, and co-operation
versus non-cooperation) and their respective impacts upon the DVs, the premium price paid for a
private company and the ROI.
Smit and Moraitis (2010) and Malmendier and Tate (2004) posit that overconfident CEOs
and their management teams are more likely to destroy value. Park and Yoo (2017) emphasized
the need to capture the extent of CEO overconfidence hubris. Hambrick and Mason (1984) first
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described this concept as the Upper Echelon Theory, the ability of the CEO to impose his
overconfident views on the decision of the firm and how they impact organizational outcomes.
The common void in the current research is that none examine CEOs of privately held
companies financially backed by private equity or investment fund managers who often
scrutinize and monitor the CEOs of their portfolio companies more closely than CEOs of
publicly traded companies.
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) posited that self-attribution tends to reinforce individual
overconfidence. Alicke (2005) asserted that "this bias is analogous to the better than average
(BtA) effect suggesting that individuals believe that they have above-average abilities" (p. 85).
Dhir and Mital (2012) referred to this “exaggerated sense of self as overly optimistic about their
assessments of integration plans, which alter their abilities to appropriate targets and scenarios to
realize synergies, and thus, overvalue targets” (p. 60). Doukas and Petmezas (2007) stipulated
that "self-attribution bolsters overconfidence and managers who suffer from this bias are more
likely to be overconfident in their judgment and overestimate the positive or negative outcome of
a merger" (p. 7). Doukas and Petmezas (2007) stated that in the M&A framework
“overconfidence is displayed in two forms: first, a manager may overestimate the synergy gains
of a potential merger. Typically, this overvaluation originates from the manager’s belief that his
leadership skills are better than average and is often followed by his or underestimation of the
downside of the merger due to his illusion of his having control over its outcome” (p. 2). “This
kind of overconfidence has the propensity to induce value-destroying mergers” (Malmendier &
Tate, 2004, p. 2). Choi et al. (2017) examined overconfidence coupled with self-attribution bias
effects on top corporate investment managers. They found that the two exacerbates the stickiness
of investment cash flow sensitivity.
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Doukas and Petmezas (2007) posited that "managerial overconfidence is often more
pronounced in acquisitions in which there is little information about the target in which cases the
managers are more likely to rely upon their own erroneous beliefs and acquisition decisionmaking skills” (p. 2). Typically, this arises when the CEO has had a series of successful
acquisition transactions that have enhanced their confidence to the level that they perceive that
they cannot fail. Thus, I am of the opinion that experiments in private company acquisitions are
ideal for testing the overconfidence hypothesis because managers' subjective evaluations of the
potential gains or losses are more likely to motivate their investment decisions and the economic
results manifest themselves in the outcomes whether or not a premium price is paid for a private
company or the desired ROI achieved.
Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2019) defined overconfidence as “a bias in which people
believe that they are smarter and more informed than they are, which is why they overestimate
their abilities to make a reasonable and optimal decision” (p. 650). Li and Tang (2010) suggested
that overconfidence is highly associated with risk-taking. Baker and Wurgler (2011) stated that it
“leads to an increased number of mergers and acquisitions deals that lead to diversification, often
of dubious value” (p. 52). Skvortsova (2021) asserted that “the impact of two cognitive biases,
namely CEO overconfidence and availability bias, defined as the distortion that arises resulting
from the availability of the most recent information, significantly influences CEO behavior
encouraging them to be irrational in M&A deals" (p. 3).
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) studied the impacts of senior managers’ overconfidence
on firm decisions and outcomes, including acquisition premiums investment distortion.
Hayward’s (2006) findings suggested that firms with overconfident managers typically pay
higher premiums for acquisitions and rely on internal financing rather than external. Hambrick
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and Mason (1984) explored the upper echelons perspective, finding that the managers'
background characteristics can predict organizational outcomes. Malmendier and Tate (2015)
suggested that overconfident managers often miss their internal earnings forecasts and undertake
more value-destroying mergers.
These outcomes could be particularly profound in the kind of environment surrounding
successful private equity and investment fund managers who may have previously executed
many successful accretive value transactions. In this context, “overconfidence can be construed
to be an unrealistic belief held by the acquiring manager's and CEO’s teams that they can
manage and operate the assets of a private target company more efficiently than its current
management team” (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, p. 103-127).
The consistent gap in this literature is that it does not contrast private equity and or
investment fund M&A investment professionals’ acquisitions of privately held companies to
publicly traded companies. Most private equity funds highly leverage their acquisitions to
preserve the use of the fund’s available capita. This enables the fund to deploy its capital for
other acquisition transactions and to financially shore up the balance sheet of those portfolio
companies whom they have previously purchased.
Consequently, unlike public CEOs, CEOs of private equity or investment fund sponsored
companies make one-off strategic acquisitions as opposed to acquisitions that are purportedly for
growth through the acquisition of companies that either provide access for a company’s products
to be distributed and sold into new markets or new intellectual property that sustains their
revenues in a dedicated sale channel. This is relevant to this research as I seek to prove that
overconfidence behavior exhibited by a private equity and investment fund manager (buyers)
impacts the economic outcome in an acquisition of a privately held company.
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Malmendier and Tate (2005) stated that "the biggest challenge for the analysis of
overconfidence is to construct a plausible measure of overconfidence. Bias beliefs naturally defy
direct and precise measurement" (p. 2). Malmendier and Tate (2004) proposed two approaches to
measuring the overconfidence of public company CEOs. The first was a revealed beliefs
argument. Hayward et al. (2004) purported that CEOs' (not unlike private equity fund managers’)
beliefs about the company's future successful performance are derived from their portfolio of
successful transactions. The second approach captures how outsiders (the public) perceive them.
Malmendier and Tate (2004) classify CEOs as overconfident based on their portrayal in the
press. The first approach requires detailed information about CEOs portfolio transactions in their
company’s stocks and options.
Malmendier and Tate (2005) referred to a unique panel of data set on Forbes 500
companies, collected by Yermack (1995) and Hall and Liebman (1998), that provided these
details including duration, exercise price, and vesting period of each executive option package.
They constructed a measure of overconfidence using CEOs compensation packages from
publicly traded companies, often including extensive stock-based compensation. Typically,
CEOs hold their options until they are well in the money and buy, rather than sell, their
company’s stock. As suggested by Malmendeir and Tate (2015), “One way to potentially
measure overconfidence is to look at CEOs who hold options beyond rational thresholds” (p. 40).
Hall and Murphy (2002) suggested exercising options when entering the final year of duration
when the option value exceeds 40%. Malmendier and Tate (2005) considered a sample of CEOs
with options beyond these benchmarks and compared those who exercise options (the rational) to
CEOs who continue to hold (the overconfident). They computed the returns CEOs earned due to
their trading decisions to check whether these exercise decisions were driven by inside
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information. They found no evidence that CEOs achieved abnormal returns by holding options
beyond rational benchmarks. Hall and Murphy (2002) posited that overconfidence should be
removed and risk taking inserted: “There is a statistically significant relationship between the
increase in option holdings by executives and the subsequent increase in firm risk” (p. 6).
What Behaviors Cause Irrational Decision-Making?
Classical economic theory assumes that individuals are rational (Smith, 1776). However,
irrational behavior continually manifests itself in decisions that do not maximize utility and lead
to economic loss in M&A. Irrational behavior is not isolated to a few individuals but can become
a dominant choice for many people in specific societal and business contexts. A classic example
is the tulip mania in Holland in 1695. The American Psychology Association defines irrationality
as the state, condition, or quality of lacking rational thought. The term is typically used in
relation to cognitive behavior (e.g., thinking, decision making that is illogical or delusional). In
psychology, the phenomenon that causes irrational decisions is called cognitive bias, which a
mistake in reasoning, evaluating, remembering, or other cognitive processes, often occurring
because of holding onto one's preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary information.
Ariely (2008) posited that “the defining qualities of irrational decisions often occur
outside of conscious thought and are emotionally charged” (pp. 128-129). Bernard (1938)
suggested that emotions can complement rational decision choices; thus, decisions imbued with
emotions are not synonymous with irrationality. While irrational decision-making could be
valuable in making good decisions, Bernard (1938) suggested it is unreliable because it is
unquantifiable. Bernard (1938) posited that irrational behavior is not well expressed in words or
as reasoned judgment; thus, discerning the value of decisions made through irrational behavior is
challenging.
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Overconfidence bias, or overoptimism, manifests itself as the circumstance in which
managers pay excessively for a target company by overvaluing their competency to run it (Roll,
1986). Doukas and Petmezas (2007) argued that “overconfidence results from a self-attribution
bias” (p. 6). Specifically, “overconfident managers feel to have superior analytical skills,
decision-making abilities exceeding their peers, and better information than the seller” (Doukas
& Petmezas, 2007, p. 8).
The void in the literature is that there is no presence of studies of private equity and
investment fund managers of how cognitive biases encourages private equity fund and
investment managers to promote their judgments in decision-making and engage in highly
complex acquisitions transactions that are not necessarily homogenous with exiting investment
strategy and/or asset portfolio strategy of the private equity or investment fund’s respective
charter. In the world of finance, these fund managers tend to underestimate acquisition risks and
overestimate potential synergy from a business acquisition due to their overconfidence.
When investigating other measures of overconfidence, Lambert and Bessiere (2012)
expanded on these arguments using evidence from experiments to conclude that investment
professionals and bankers were biased by their overconfidence. Lamber and Bessiere (2012)
showed that overconfidence affected these professionals' (bankers) valuation and investment
choices, and risk aversion did not affect their investment decisions. “Overconfidence is lower
when people are given detailed information” (Camerer & Malmendier, 2007, p. 246). Dhir and
Mital (2012) implied that “decisions based on overconfidence often indicate a loss of contact
with reality and individuals’ overestimating their competence or capabilities, notably when the
person exhibiting this state is in a position of power” (p. 65).
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The study of overconfidence includes several branches of behavioral economics and
psychology disciplines. First, the literature on experiments contains results documenting the
tendency of individuals to consider themselves above average on positive characteristics (Alicke,
2005; Kruger, 1999). Second, using an experimental approach, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010)
concluded that younger, experienced investors tend to believe more strongly in having aboveaverage abilities. In this regard, age and work experience are significantly related to
overconfidence. This was not the case for gender. Beckman and Menkhoff (2008) found the
effect size of excess over confidence by women was small in fund management when they
conducted a survey of 649 fund managers (125 women) in the US, Germany, Italy, and Thailand.
“The BtA effect also affects the attribution of causality” (Alicke, 2005, p. 86). Because
“individuals expect their behavior to produce success, they attribute outcomes to their actions
when they succeed and to bad luck when they fail” (Miller & Ross, 1975, p. 213). This selfserving attribution of results reinforces overconfidence. Miller and Ross (1975) found that
overconfident managers are more likely to pursue acquisitions when they have abundant internal
resources. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) observed that “overconfident managers use more cash to
finance their mergers” (p. 5) more often than other managers who leverage the target private
company’s revenue.
Pikulina and Rennenboog (2017) confirmed that the higher the subject’s overconfidence
in their financial knowledge the higher their chosen investment risk level. Broihanne et al. (2014)
concluded that “the risk that finance professionals are willing to take on is positively influenced
by overconfidence” (pp. 64-65). Brozynski et al. (2004) found in the survey that they conducted
that the degree of risk taking does decrease with experience. In corporate finance, Malmendier
and Tate (2005) observed the impact of overconfidence on over investment or preference for
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debt financing. Menkhoff et al. (2006) surveyed 117 German fund managers and analyzed the
relationship between experience, overconfidence, and risk-taking. The authors found that
overconfidence decreases with experience as does risk-taking. Lambert et al. (2012) found that
bankers were strongly influenced by overconfidence in investment choice and valuation and that
risk aversion had no effect on investment decision-making. Beckman and Menkhoff (2008)
found that the framing effect, financial decisions involving clear incentives, reduces the gender
difference in risk aversion. Beckman and Menkhoff (2008) posit that “there seem to be two
separate forces which reduce the gender difference in risk aversion, familiarity with risk and risk
decision under financial framing” (p. 2) amongst women that are considered financial experts.
They continue their study by testing whether risk behavior is associated with overconfidence and
tournament behavior.
I concurred with Lambert and Bessiere’s (2012) assessment that the impact of
“overconfidence in investment decision-making should be assessed at varying stages of the
dynamic process: the judgment, the valuation, and the decision process” (p. 1116). Asaoka
(2019) concurred by stating that “practitioners typically deploy the use of the one-factor capital
asset pricing model (CAPM). Private equity financiers and financial analyst professionals in the
mergers and acquisitions industry know that CAPM modeling is predicated upon substantial
human discretion and judgment elements, which cannot guarantee that the value will be
objective” (p. 9).
How do these varying perspectives fit into this research? These elements have been
incorporated into the four-game theory structured experiments in this research by examining how
overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage, cooperation/non-cooperation, and the
interaction of the latter two variables influence the valuation of a company by focusing upon the
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premium price paid for a privately held company and the ROI achieved by private equity and
investment fund managers as a result of their judgment and decision making.
Lying for Strategic Advantage in M&A
Ariely (2008) makes the case that most people are both honest and dishonest. Ariely
(2008) stated that “most circumstances that elicit emotions, sexual arousal, hunger, anger, and
compassion, can lead to irrational behavior. Emotions are inherently nonrational” (pp. 128-129).
According to Ariely (2008), “individuals’ dishonesties and lies center on two main objectives:
1) preventing an undesirable outcome and 2) securing desirable outcomes that people
anticipate as unobtainable or unsuccessful when viewing the situation realistically” (p. 271).
“Lying for strategic advantage is about planned actions or intentions. Lying in these cases
frequently takes the extreme form of active misrepresentation instead of less than complete and
honest disclosure” (Crawford, 2001, p. 2). Crawford (2001) proposed a model of active
misrepresentation toward competitors or enemies, allowing for the possibility of bounded
rationality. Although Crawford’s (2001) statement is about lying in general and is not in
reference to private equity fund managers, this behavior action or emotion commonly manifests
itself among private equity and investment fund managers during M&A transactions in which
there is a substantial economic outcome potential to each of the buyer and seller. “The
assumption of such abound simplifies many aspects of the analysis of games with
communication” (Crawford, 2001, p. 8). Furthermore, Crawford (2001) devised this model with
sequential equilibria agents, as rational players exploiting boundedly rational players who are not
fooled during the two-person bargaining process like that which takes place in a private equity
manger or investment manager negotiating the purchase price of a privately held company.
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These strategies are simple, portable behavioral strategies (Crawford, 2001). Negotiations in
which no one is exploited are typical of equilibrium amongst the negotiation parties.
An example non-directional cheap talk, or a statement with little meaning, is of former
President Bush's regrettable 1988 campaign promise: read my lips no new taxes! (Royko, 1988).
Crawford (2001) explained that this example depicts two standard features of these behaviors,
one involving misrepresentation via agreements, statements, or non-statement that in themselves
have little or no direct costs and the other occurring in situations where the parties have
predominantly conflicting interests leading to successful deception benefits for the deceiver at
the expense of the deceived. Numerous researchers modeled the features of these examples as
communications via costless messages (Charness, 2000; Crawford, 2001).
In a model including costless messages, the assumption is that players ignore these
messages when the system is in equilibrium (i.e., when symmetry in communications exists). “If
a player could benefit by responding to the other player's message, their response could hurt the
other player, who could change their message to create an advantage using uninformative or
asymmetrical information” (Crawford, 2001, p. 8). A mortal player in this model is depicted
when they rationally maximize their payoff, like a private equity fund manager in a zero-sum
game acquisition transaction. “Their beliefs are unsustainable for an equilibrium to exist because
that requires symmetrical beliefs and communications” (Crawford, 1998, p. 288). Thus, in
equilibrium with symmetrical communications, no information is conveyed by the messages, but
neither are the players fooled (Crawford, 2001). In this model, equilibrium is a combination of
decision rules or strategies, distinct for each decision-maker. “Each player's strategy maximizes
their personal expected utility or payoff given the strategies of others who operate in the same
way” (Crawford, 2001, p. 8) (Crawford, 2016, pp. 136-137). Myerson (1999) wrote “the
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generality, tractability, and precision of equilibrium analysis have made this analysis an approach
of choice in most economic applications of game theory” (p. 1077). Crawford and Costa (2013)
concluded that researchers use experimental research to clarify players’ initial responses and how
they often deviate systematically from equilibrium.
Gratch et al. (2016) found that negotiators did not have perfect access to opponents'
preferences but by inferences made by exchanging information during negotiations. “In buyer
and seller negotiations, the opponent's preferences are inferred by exchanging written purchase
offers and counter-proposals” (Baarslag et al., 2012, p. 4). “In these negotiations, preferences are
most commonly inferred from explicit preference statements” (Nazari & Gratch, 2016, p. 730).
Gneezy (2011) posited that "in some cases, a lie can harm the liar but help the other
person; these are altruistic white lies. People may choose such lies because they care about the
other person's payoffs" (p. 2). Gneezy (2011) referred to the second type of white lie as Pareto
improvement (i.e., when both sides earn more due to the lie). “When there is no cost for lying, an
expectation is that people frequently tell lies of this type” (Gneezy et al., 2011, p. 2). Gneezy
(2011) posited that understanding when people tell white lies is crucial to understanding
deception. As Gneezy (2011) stated, "First, people who are reluctant to tell Pareto white lies
demonstrate an aversion to lying independent of their preferences' social or economic outcome.
Such people refrain from lying not because of the consequences but because they view lying as
an immoral act in itself. This provides the best test of the pure cost of lying” (p. 2).
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) conceptualized black lies, which involve the liar accruing
benefits at the other's expense and are likely to have very different profit payoff concerns than
the consequences of white lies where both parties benefit. Gneezy et al. (2011) posited that
“contrasting white lies with black lies supports explanations of the interaction between payoff
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distribution and aversion to lying” (p. 2). This tact underscores a private equity and investment
fund managers’ purpose in employing black lies. The contrast helps identify different
professionals on the sale side of an acquisition transaction that private equity or investment fund
manager may encounter. For example, the expected motivation to tell a selfish black lie is that
the player puts more weight on the liar's payoffs. In contrast, “the motivation to tell an altruistic
white lie may arise from placing higher importance on another's payoff in the liar's utility
function” (Gneezy, 2011, p. 2).
Dreber and Johannesson (2008) demonstrated gender differences in the tendency to lie.
Notably, “men are more likely to tell a selfish black lie” (Dreber & Johannesson, p. 197).
Contrasting men’s and women’s behaviors concerning lying support testing of gender distinct
interactions regarding payoff distribution and lying aversion. They concluded statistical
significance when testing black lies; in other words, men tend to tell a black lie more often than
women. In the domain of selfish black lies (Gneezy et al., 2001), the experimental results are
consistent with those of Dreber and Johannesson (2008) because men were more likely to tell a
selfish black lie. Moreover, men were significantly more likely to tell a Pareto white lie.
However, women were considerably more likely than men to tell an altruistic white lie.
In this study, I had embedded the use of lying for strategic advantage by both the buyers
and the sellers in several of the experiments (transactions), of which the participants’ genders
were both male and female, to investigate whether lying for strategic advantage impacts upon the
premium price paid and the ROI achieved by buyers employing the behavior and applying
control variables (i.e., skill level, years' work experience, and financial knowledge).
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Cooperation Versus Non-Cooperation
Nash (1950) introduced the distinction between cooperative and noncooperative
bargaining in two-person negotiations (games): "cooperation is meant to imply that the players
have complete freedom of communication and complete information on the structure of the
game. It assumes that either player may secure an enforceable commitment contract if he
desires" (pp. 48-49). Each player is not supposed to have a commitment before entering the game
(negotiation). The committed player should have an advantage provided that the other player is
rational, and that the commitment allows some mutually profitable agreement. As a natural
solution for noncooperative games, Nash (1951) introduced the concept of equilibrium points.
Nash (1950) posited "a two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the
opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way … non-action taken by one of
the individuals without the consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one" (p.
24).
The literature gap that is most ostensible relative to cooperation versus noncooperation is
that cooperation and noncooperation are nominal human behavioral actions often driven by the
relevant context’s circumstances such as conflicting personalities.
Fudenberg et al. (2012) posited that cooperative strategies yield higher payoffs than
uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. Rigdon et al. (2007)
examined how cooperation can be sustained once it emerges. Cooper (2014) suggested that
cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if the players understand that cheating will be
punished. Thus, “one might conclude that communication and cooperation stabilize collusion but
is insufficient to generate persistent collusion” (Cooper, 2014, p. 273). Nash (1950) stated “a
solution means a determination of the amount of satisfaction each individual should expect to get
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from the situation, or, rather, a determination of how much it should be worth to each of these
individuals to have the opportunity to bargain” (p. 155). However, Von Neuman and
Morgenstern (1944) idealized that the individuals are highly rational in this situation, a nonzerosum game.
Fudenberg (2012) posited that, outside the laboratory, actions are often observed with
noise, an awkward or inconvenient action that may have been well-intentioned. Similarly, a selfinterested action may wind up accidentally benefiting another. Although there are evolutionary
arguments for cooperation in repeated games with efficient actions, the evolutionary arguments
for cooperative equilibria are even more robust with imperfect observations, as the possibility
that punishment may be triggered by mistake. These potential mistakes decrease the viability of
unrelenting or grim strategies with a single erroneous or outlier observation by never cooperating
again (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
Human Negotiation Behavior
Multi-issue negotiations have been studied extensively from the perspectives of game
theory (Nash, 1950, 1951), behavioral game theory (Roth, 1995), and psychology (Pruitt, 1981).
Research has clarified the critical and systematic differences between rational predictions and
actual human behavior. In particular, “people rarely act out of pure self-interest” (Gneezy, 2011,
p. 2). Instead, they exhibit other-regarding preferences, such as the desire for fairness and
reciprocity. Most human negotiators strive for fair and efficient solutions (Nash equilibrium) and
often discover these to the extent they engage in reciprocal information exchange. However,
“this creates the opportunity for malicious negotiators to misrepresent their preferences for
strategic gain” (Gratch et al., 2016, p. 729).
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The misrepresentation game can be significantly simplified if we know the other player’s
preferences before the negotiation (Gratch et al., 2016). This prerequisite might occur if the other
participant truthfully reveals their preferences, or the liar has conducted sufficient research to
estimate them accurately (Crawford, 2001). When the opponent’s preferences are known, the
game can be cast as an optimization problem for all possible preference weights on each issue,
identifying the set of weights that maximizes the value to self while seeming fair (Gratch, 2016).
The cooperative principle of language suggests that human negotiators feel bound by
social norms of honesty (Crawford, 2001) and engage in reciprocal information exchange
(Crawford & Costa, 2013). If preference information is provided by one party, the other party
should reciprocate. This exchange implies that a negotiator cannot elicit their opponent's
preferences without giving up some information in return. “Premature lies can limit the liar's
options” (Gratch et al., 2016, p. 731).
Although each of these authors has written articles about cheap talk, misrepresentative
statements, deception, or noise in terms of their impact upon economic outcomes, no one has
examined them using an environmental context of game theory structured experiments solely
using private equity firms and investment funds investment managers in an environment which
could control their respective behaviors' impacts in order to examine more closely the impact
upon the premium price paid for privately held companies and upon the ROI.
Agency
“Corporate managers are agents of the shareholders, a relationship fraught with
conflicting interest” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 1). Hill and Jones (1992) define an agency
relationship as "one in which one or more persons (the principals) engages another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making

35

authority to the agent" (p. 132). Hill and Jones (1992) stated that “both principal-agent and
stakeholders-agent relationships involve explicit and implicit contracts between the stakeholders
and managers, leaving managers with direct control over the decision-making apparatus” (p.
133). Eisenhardt (1989) stated that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal, that the cornerstone of agency theory is the assumption that the interest of the
principals and the agent diverge. Sapeinza et al. (2000) posited that “agency problems are
exacerbated because the interest of management is in conflict with shareholders (goal conflict)
and because shareholders have less access to information than management on which to make an
educated decision regarding the performance of the management” (p. 332). This is commonly
referred to as information asymmetry.
Eisenhardt (1989) outlined the fundamental assumptions of agency: “1) goal divergence
between the principal and the agent, 2) hidden information before or after contracting the agent,
and 3) the principal and agent have different risk preferences which may lead to different actions
being taken” (p. 58). Sapienza et al. (2000) stated that “in venture capital-backed firms, goal
conflict is caused by: issues of valuation, exit timing, and allocation of resources and effort” (p.
332). Sapienza et al. (2000) suggested that company managers have incentives to follow their
agendas over those of their investors once financed. The nature of the investment term allows for
an extended period in which management can misuse funds at their disposal and use discretion.
Berger et al. (1998) identified governance and control mechanisms that could
significantly impact entrenched managers: “1) the side for the board of directors, CEOs are less
entrenched due to special monitoring by the boards, 2) the threat of dismissal, 3) a large
stockholder joining the board, 4) the threat of a takeover, and 5) stock compensation-based

36

performance incentives” (p. 61). Schliefer and Vishny (1986) suggested that the more significant
the shareholding, the more willing and capable owners should monitor the manager.
Fenn et al. (1995) suggested that the following mechanisms that private equity firms
employ to align incentives of their portfolio company CEOs: “1) imposing strong discipline on
the company brought about by using a large amount of debt to finance the transaction, 2) the use
of equity-based management compensation, and 3) the use of market-related mechanisms
including for exit strategies” (p. 27). Millison and Ward (2005) indicated that “in general, the
right to exercise share options for CEOs is conditional on meeting performance targets that can
only vest over a stipulated period” (p. 76). It should be noted that often private equity firms
incentivize the CEOs of their portfolio companies to ensure that high standards of governance
are maintained. Still, they also hold substantial equity share positions and are strongly
represented on the boards of directors.
Dhir and Mital (2012) wrote that “there are two main theories; (a) rational responses to
agency costs and (b) non-rational response to managerial hubris that has been detrimental to
explain why managers make value-destroying acquisitions” (p. 59). Asaoka (2019) posited that
M&A involves significant risk-taking that must be made amidst much uncertainty and typically
within a limited timeframe. "Risk is something which should be priced into value, as is
insufficient liquidity and size. Emotion poses another type of risk; it may deserve equal attention
in the decision-making, and valuation process" (Asaoka, 2019, p. 9). Jensen (1986) stated that
"underbidding is the failure to pay the price required to secure a critical target may result from
psychological framing (bias) of the opportunity in isolation and not recognizing new growth
opportunities or fully appreciating the value of a target as part of a larger consolidation strategy”
(p. 323).

37

Agency and Opportunistic Behavior
Agency and opportunistic behavior have been the central idea of agency theory in M&A
transactions. According to theory, agents or hired fund managers and limited partner investors
objectives are not always aligned or congruent. The idea is that hired fund managers and limited
partner investors' objectives are often misaligned. Agents often make decisions based on selfserving interest rather than the private equity fund stakeholder's interest, including the company
shareholder. This self-interested decision-making is rational from the CEO’s perspective but not
aligned with the principals' interest (Hill & Jones, 1992; Jensen, 1986). “The information
available to the agent/fund managers may be complete, but their decisions are not optimal for the
stakeholder's interest. Agents’ decisions may derive from monetary or nonmonetary benefits”
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). Thus, limited partner investors can provide incentives to their private
equity general partners (GPs) and incur agency costs or apply controlling mechanisms, again
incurring agency costs to the agents or fund managers to do away with greedy decisions and
ensure normative decision-making by its agents. For this study, and from an M&A professional
practitioner’s perspective, I limited this discussion to three constructs: private equity fund
manager’s overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage, and co-operation versus non-cooperation.
Private Equity Agency Relationship and Fees
Jain (2008) summarized the legal constructs of a GPs management agreement. The
prevalent legal structure used by private equity sponsors is the limited partnership and that
partnership investment vehicles customarily have a finite life of seven to 10 years. A limited
partnership has a GP and is typically owned by the private equity fund sponsor. A fund typically
has one or more limited partner investors. Jain (2008) indicated that “the General Partner’s
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management company assesses fees to the limited partners to defray their operating expenses
during the business. Typically these expenses are comprised of: salaries, employee benefits,
office expenses, travel, business entertainment, equipment rental, bookkeeping, conducting due
diligence on acquisition targets, and fund reporting and administration” (p. 2). In larger
sponsored funds, the management fees typically range between 1% to 2.5% of the total funds
committed during the fund's investment period by the limited partners. For smaller funds, usually
under $30 million, the fees may approach 3.5%. Jain (2008) posited that “ancillary agency fees
are assessed by the management company to its limited partners as well. The management
company receives fees for these services, including investment banking transaction fees,
portfolio company monitoring fees, and director’s compensation” (pp. 2-3).
Jain (2008) reflected upon carried interest as “profit-sharing that accrues to the general
partner over and above the agency fees that his management company receives” (p. 3). In a
typical private equity and or venture capital fund capital stack, the priority of distribution is
customarily payable subordinate to the return of the principal capital invested to both the limited
partners and the GP, reimbursements of management fees charged to the limited partner
investors after the individual transaction has to meet a hurdle rate in order payout a preferred
return of 8%, which is an industrywide standard. The carried interest is the principal part of the
GP or fund managers compensation. According to Jain (2008),
Theoretically, the fee structure supposedly aligns with the limited partners’ and general
partners' economic interests. When selling an asset of the limited partnerships’ the general
partner customarily disburses: 1) the preferred return to each entity having directly or indirectly
spent its capital on the transaction, 2) the recapture of management fees, and 3) the carried
interest to limited partners than to general partners of the fund followed by others who constitute
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the limited partnership. Typically, the allocation is 80%/20%, with 80% going to the limited
partners and 20% to the general partner (p. 3).
Purchase Price Premiums Paid by the Private Equity Fund (Buyers)
Dittmar and Li (2011) found that financial bidders in private equity firms differ from
strategic corporate bidders in their motives and methods of acquisitions. They purported that
“financial bidders are typically cash-rich, with more readily available access to senior leveraged
debt and sub-debt, more skilled at identifying undervalued targets with high potential for costcutting” (Dittmar & Li, 2011, p. 1). In contrast, corporate buyers typically seek companies that
share operational synergies with them and provide new sales channels. Still, “financial buyers
rely primarily on improving the stand-alone value of the target firm or buying undervalued
assets” (Roosenboom et al., 2009, p. 4). Dittmar et al. (2011) suggested that “financial buyers
face shorter investment horizons than corporate buyers and possibly incentivize target
management differently” (p. 22). Why are their differences? Bargeron et al. (2008) and
Roosenboom et al. (2009) posited that the explanation is that public companies and private firms
acquire different types of firms. Roll (1986) suggested that CEOs with overconfidence biases
play a significant role in the overpayment of acquired companies.
Baker et al. (2009) indicated that behavioral factors could impact the pricing of targets in
acquisition transactions. Agarwal and Zeephongsekul (2011) suggested “equilibrium price is
closer to the acquirer's offer in a two-party transaction using a game theory analysis” (p. 1437).
The two-person M&A model is an incomplete information game between the acquirer and the
target. “Both players must agree to a price suitable for the sale of the target company to the
acquirer. This form of the game includes three stages in which the acquirer can choose the
"increase bid," "the reduced bid," or "the stable bid" strategy” (Agrawal et al., 2011, p. 1438).
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They define the payoff for each as the increased bid has a payoff of -1 if the acquirer must pay a
higher price and +1 to achieve a zero-sum game (Agrawal et al., 2011).
Sale Price Premium
Malmendier and Tate (2008) concluded that “the existence of market mechanisms
amplifies the effect of behavioral biases, and sellers tend to optimally choose these amplifying
market mechanisms that impact these biases to maximize their profits” (p. 1). Malmendier and
Tate (2008) suggested that “results occur via two mechanisms, including behavioral biases that
likely substantially influence the outcomes” (p. 1). Malmendier and Tate (2008) question the
philosophical underpinnings of neoclassical economics: markets attenuate the effects of
behavioral biases. Motis (2007) stated that “mergers are a means of appropriating private
company information, affecting bidding and premiums” (p. 18). Dionne and Le Haye (2015)
empirically tested determinants of premiums identified in past studies, assuming asymmetric
information in M&A. They concluded that significant stakeholders of a target’s shares had a
distinct advantage, and these stakeholders encouraged agents to take actions that increase longrun value. Dionne and La Haye (2015) concluded that informed buyers lower the premiums paid
in acquisitions.
Conclusions
This literature review has focused on examining the explanatory variables of behaviors,
and how biases can change the relationships between predictors and the outcome(s) aggregated
and investigated in this research. The literature supports the idea that premium price paid and
ROI could depend on overconfidence biases, lying for strategic advantage, and co-operation/nonco-operation motivation and their respective behavior impacts. Thus, these variables warrant a
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deeper investigation of the relationships to private equity fund manager overconfidence and each
IVs respective impact(s).
Based on the literature and evidence described in this review, I developed four
experiments incorporating acquisition and investment transactions using two-person business
decision-making interaction simulating the bargaining problems that occur during acquisition
transactions. Each of the experiments (transactions) has distinct levels of business risk for the
participating private equity fund managers and M&A professionals to achieve a competitive ROI
for the financial reward of $1,500 offered to the participant with the highest ROI. These mock
transactions/experiments enabled me to collect relevant data for modeling the potential causal
relationships among the causal variables of overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage,
and cooperation/non-cooperation in strategic decision-making by private equity and investment
fund managers affecting private company acquisitions. To increase the reliability and validity of
the results, I determined the need to design each experiment carefully and incorporate the context
and inter-relatedness of variables in the experiments.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
This quantitative study employed four experiments similar to the two-person interactive
game theory approach to modeling a private equity and investment fund manager’s
overconfidence behavior as one of three primary IVs and behavioral interaction during decisionmaking negotiations with economic outcomes. The other IVs examined were lying for strategic
advantage and cooperation versus noncooperation. These variables were embedded into the
context of the four-game theory structured experiments that were intended to discern the
participants’ overconfidence bias and cognitive bias behavior traits, whether rational and
irrational, and to depict how the control variables (e.g., BtA, CBO, skill and years’ work
experience) mediate decision-making relationships between buyers and sellers in private
company acquisition transactions and the impacts of these independent and control variables on
the premium purchase price paid and the ROI, the DVs.
Quantitative research can include theory deductively through testing and verifying theory
or inductively by systematically manipulating one or more variables. “Inductive investigation
furthers understanding of how manipulations impact the outcomes of interest” (Creswell, 2018,
pp. 63-64). The experiments were specifically designed to extract causal information concerning
the relationships among the variables (Field, 2018).
Research Design and Approach
I employed a quantitative research design by using two-person behavioral interaction
games similar to game theory games inset in four separate experiments that simulated differing
degrees of risk while examining interactive decision-making during the acquisition of private
companies. Similar to Jones and Hynie (2017), I used the combination of a contest for an
economic payoff in a contextual setting simulating investment transactions and the participant
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roleplaying in the four experiments to examine the participants’ strengths, behavioral traits, and
the importance of the relationships between specific pairings of three constructs. The three
constructs were: 1) private equity fund and investment manager’s overconfidence bias, 2) lying
for strategic advantage, and 3) cooperation versus non-cooperation and the interaction between
lying and cooperation during the negotiations for the acquisition/sale of a private company. To
more closely examine the inter-relationships and glean a deeper understanding of the mediating
and moderating variables influences, I utilized experiments similar to game theory games with
29 purposefully selected private equity and investment fund managers M&A professionals
participated in one of the four experiments on the Zoom platform in games implemented once in
realistically simulated business transaction contexts and conditions. Three participants played
roles in the experiments played four games twice, rendering permutations of (29 x 1) + (3 x 2) =
32 data points for the variables: overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and cooperation
versus non-co-operation during transaction negotiations.
Quantitative research methods may include theory deductively in quantitative theory
testing and verification or inductively. In experiments, one or more variables are systematically
manipulated to evaluate the impacts on the outcomes of interest (Creswell, 2018). Goldman et al.
(1998) defined quantitative research as explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data
analyzed using mathematically based methods (i.e., inferential statistics). The data collected
from the participants’ communications, interaction during decision-making and the economic
outcomes of the experiments were expected to link the primary variables operationalized
constructs traits and characteristics about the population to the concepts under study. The key
variables examined were:
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§ IVs: overconfidence bias, lying for strategic advantage, and co-operation/non-cooperation and interaction (between lying for strategic advantage and cooperation).
§ DVs: The impact of the above-listed predictor or causal variables upon the premium
price paid and the ROI for acquiring a private company.
§ Controls: skill, BtA, CBO score, and years’ work experience.
Statement of Hypotheses
§

H1: When overconfidence bias is exhibited by an M&A professional (buyer) in
investment decision-making, it increases the premium price paid for a private
company acquisition, thus decreasing the ROI.

§

H2: When lying for strategic advantage is used by an M&A professional (buyer) in
M&A, it reduces the premium price paid for the private company acquisition, thus
decreasing the ROI for the transaction.

§

H3: Noncooperation between an M&A professional (buyer) and a private company
seller increases the premium price paid for the purchase price of a private company
and diminishes the ROI for the transaction.

Experiment Settings Used for Human Behavior Interaction Observation
Experiments provide the mechanism for insight into strategic human behavior interaction,
whether it is rational or irrational, during the negotiation of M&A transactions with significant
economic outcomes. Contemporary game theory has two forms: non-cooperative game theory
(Nash, 1950, 1951) and co-operative game theory (Myerson 1977; Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Nash (1950, 1951, 1953) have
suggested two-game theory approaches to resolve bargaining problems: axiomatic or strategic
(Kuhn & Harsanyi, 1995).
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The axiomatic approach (cooperative theory) assists by providing a set of valuable
axioms (Nash, 1950). On the other hand, the strategic dominant strategy model depicts outcomes
in a non-cooperative game in an M&A context. M&A fall under the premise of zero-sum or
noncooperative two-player games. Nash (1950, 1951) essentially formed two theoretical
frameworks that offer insight into private equity fund and investment fund manager's (financial
buyers) personality characteristics and negotiation behavior during an M&A transaction for a
private company.
Bargaining theory is the branch of game theory dealing with the analysis of bargaining
problems, in which participants bargain over the division of some economic benefit or goods.
Nash (1950) posits that a solution to a bargaining problem means determining a division of the
economic benefit or interests. Nash (1950) developed co-operative theories such as two-person
collaborative or interest-based negotiation that involves the parties to meet each other’s needs
and satisfy interests jointly. Thus, the outcome is of mutual benefit or nonzero-sum games. An
example I observed during the four experiments conducted was older, more experienced male
investment professionals disregarded their instruction not to cooperate and immediately agreed
to share transaction information to attain an agreement more quickly and win the $1,500 price for
the highest ROI. Further, female participants openly shared transaction information that leveled
the playing field for both buyers and sellers.
I selected the use of the two-person human interaction and decision-making game theory
model because the assumption is that of incomplete information used between the buyers and
sellers of a private target company, where both players must mutually agree to a price
appropriate for both. The buyers’ behavior bias often manifested itself during the negotiating or
communication game. A game theory structure is ideal for modeling the effects of the human
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behaviors examined in this study. Based on their expected payoff, the buyers and sellers must
choose to share information openly, lie or refrain from lying for strategic advantage, or assume
co-operation or non-cooperation with the other.
Study Population and Sampling
Sample Population
The purposeful sample of 32 M&A professionals was comprised of males (n = 26) and
females (n = 6) from the nationwide population of private equity and investment fund managers.
These individuals are legally required to have FINRA registered securities and wealth
management licenses. The two participating M&A attorneys were U.S. Securities Exchange
registered and are licensed to practice securities law in multiple states. Principal-agent problems
are not uniformly present amongst the diverse sample selected. These two theoretical
frameworks of Nash (1950, 1951) potentially offer insights into private equity fund and
investment fund managers' (financial buyers) personality characteristics and negotiation behavior
during a merger and or an acquisitions transaction.
Sample for Experiment
I used a purposeful sample of M&A professionals for the four-game theory structured
experiments intended to simulate various degrees of transactional risk and behavioral
interactions during economic decision-making with expected economic outcomes. I chose a
purposeful or non-probability sampling (Patton, 1980) because these participants can offer rich
information concerning the study phenomenon and context. Although a purposeful sample is a
non-probability sampling technique, the method can lead to a sample representative of the larger
population because of the participants’ respective transactional expertise, significant professional
years’ work experience of 15-20 years, and educational attainment.

47

Units of Analysis
The selection criteria for inclusion in the sample of 32 participants required they were
private equity and M&A professionals who are leaders in their respective fields (i.e., these
participants had to be private equity fund managers, M&A investment bankers, family office
fund managers, corporate M&A team leaders, or securities lawyers). They were expected to
articulate their experiences related to the behavioral phenomena under investigation. Their ages
were 34 to 64 years old (M = 38.2 for women and M = 52.5 for men). The mean educational
attainment was 6.5 years of university for men and 6.2 for women. Ethnicity and race were
stratified in the sample. They included one African American male, two Asian American (one
man and one woman), one man identifying as Hispanic American, an Indian male, and 22 were
Caucasian males and females. These individuals were the units of analysis and proportionately
represented the demographics of the private equity profession and related industries.
Units of Observation
The observation unit was the players' behavioral interaction and responses in the context
of the four simulated acquisition transaction scenarios and the impact of their decision-making
upon the premium price paid for private companies and their ROI. The units selected
proportionate represent the demographic comprising the private equity community.
Each participant possessed a minimum of 15 to 20 years of M&A experience in their
respective fields of M&A law, M&A corporate finance, M&A transactional structuring, and
M&A negotiation tactics and strategies. Some of the participants were involved in a short survey
conducted in a qualitative research class. From the survey results, I discovered that each
participant possessed firsthand experience working in transaction negotiations and dealing with
irrational behaviors, particularly private equity fund manager overconfidence. Additionally, the
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criteria for selection included that the participants have actively worked on an average of three
M&A transactions per year for the past five years. As a sidenote, except for my engagement and
work with the firms of the two M&A lawyers, I had not worked with either M&A lawyer
directly. There was no prior or current financial relationship between any participants and me.
Steps were taken to overcome both sampling error and bias (Ruel, 2016). Steps were
attempted, such as spending a significant amount of time locating and recruiting women with
private equity investment track records to participate. Furthermore, an extra effort was made to
ensure gender and racial-ethnic diversity representation in the sample. The expected level of
confidence in the sample and the data were those calculations that supported the inferences. I
cross-referenced the confidence interval calculations to Cohen’s (1992) power primer.
Specifying the “ES” was the most challenging part of power analysis. The difficulty was
partly due to the generally low level of consciousness of the magnitude of phenomena under
study (Cohen, 1992). Although the sample of 32 sample participants were chosen from the start
by estimation and then recruitment, I realized the potential to increase the sample size to achieve
a higher confidence level and validity. I used G*Power to compute the effect size of the sample.
According to Cohen (1992), power, by definition, is the ability to find a statistically significant
difference when the null hypothesis is false. The power of the study was determined by three
factors: the sample size, the alpha level, and the effect size. I sought to determine the appropriate
sample size for each test and justify a sample size. To answer this question, I chose the alpha
level and estimated the effect size. Cohen (1977, 1988) justified the use of levels of effect sizes.
G*Power, t-test, and descriptive statistics were calculated at the end of each of the three periods
over which the experiments were conducted to assure that the data were robust (Table 1 and 2).
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-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------At the onset, I estimated that the sample size would require 15 participants per factor
examined. 90 invitations were sent alongside a disclosure letter. Initially, a negligible response
was received, so the invitations were sent to a second group of 25 persons. Ultimately, 32
purposefully selected M&A professionals agreed to participate. This fell short of the sample size
estimate of 45 persons needed.
Coverage and sampling errors were factored into the regression models reliability and
validity. The data were checked for type I and type II errors according to Cohen (1992), who
stated “that the statistical power of a significance test is the long-term probability, given the
population effective sample and when the effective sample is not equal to zero, that H, is false
and error exists in failure to reject the hypothesis” (p. 158).
A one-way ANOVA was used to assess whether a significant difference existed between
private fund managers (n = 16), family office investment managers (n = 6), SEC lawyers (n = 7),
and investment bankers (n = 3). Results of the ANOVA (Table 3) revealed that there were
significant differences in the means of BtA, F(3,28) = 3.01, p = .057, and marginally significance
of CBO, F(3,28) = 2.24, p = .11.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------To generalize the sample to the population in the quantitative research design, I employed
triangulation on the experimental data generated from the four experiments: the financial
knowledge questionnaire, the participants’ CBO scores, and BtA scores. The data collected from
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the instruments were used as IVs and regressed on the two primary DVs to analyze and develop
results to address the research questions.
Response errors, non-response errors, and bias were mitigated by storing participants'
information on a dedicated server accompanied by their responses and scores on the financial
knowledge test collected via Qualtrics or the dedicated server that was password encrypted to
prevent third party access the research data. Providing instructions to all participants at the onset
of each of the three experiments allowed the participants not to be biased toward any particular
measurement. The construct of the questions used in the experiments avoided dichotomy and
was balanced with open-ended and closed-ended questions. There were no forced choices in
experimental scenarios, which included a neutral option, risk-averse transaction.
Data Collection Methods and Instruments
I incorporated four experiments structured similar to the game theory model. The
participants were private equity and investment fund managers, M&A investment bankers,
family office fund managers, and SEC registered securities lawyers. The behavioral interactions
of the participants were recorded in the context of experiments exhibiting overconfidence, lying
for strategic advantage, and cooperation versus non-cooperation during private company
acquisition transactions. The aim was to understand how these variables impacted the DVs, the
premium price paid and ROI for a private company.
The theoretical propositions that I investigated were as follows:
§ Whether overconfidence bias impacts M&A decision-making for investment and
acquisition of private companies.
§ How is overconfidence defined in investment decision-making circumstances?
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§ Does overconfidence bias behaviors, lying for strategic advantage, non-cooperation,
and the interaction between lying and cooperation impact the premium price paid for
companies?
§ Do these predictor/causal variables have an impact on ROI?
Experiments in Behavioral Interaction Design & Investment Scenarios
Many researchers have theorized a relationship between overconfidence, investment
decisions, and the assumptions generated from the activities of public company CEOs. However,
these relationships remained without much support and were not well-defined when the current
study began. Most attempts by other authors to examine these relationships were through
experimental studies using students as participants. Roll (1986), Doukas (2007) and Malmendier
and Tate (2004, 2005, 2008) posit that self-confidence and self-efficacy are considered as
necessary ingredients for success.
This study incorporated four simulated investments or acquisition transactions via
experiments structured similarly to a game theory experiment modeled to uncover private equity
fund and investment managers’ human behavioral interactions during games with an economic
outcome or payoff by both participants, using three IVs: overconfidence, lying for strategic
advantage, and cooperation/noncooperation. I also examined the interaction between lying and
cooperation during negotiations and decision-making and how the control variables (gender,
skill, educational attainment and years of work experience) depicted the relationship(s) between
buyers and sellers in an M&A transaction and how these variables impact the premium price
paid and ROI for a private company, the DVs.
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Overconfidence via Financial Knowledge Testing
Subsequent research was conducted on various authors’ direct measures of
overconfidence of the participant’s direct financial knowledge and confidence in their ability,
specifically in investment decisions. Table 4 shows the participant’s skill level was assigned after
the financial knowledge test. Several measures were tested, such as the CBO score and BtA,
particularly to ascertain if overconfidence results in the participants making aggressive, risky
investment decisions based on their perception of their skill level being higher. Table 5 presents
the average skill level of the participants for each chosen experiment. Table 6 shows the behavior
and outcomes summary.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLES 4, 5, AND 6 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------In step 1 of the experiment, I used the sample group participants’ overconfidence in their
financial knowledge as a proxy for their beliefs about their skill level and compared it with the
sample group's actual skill level to obtain their respective estimations of skill and BtA measures
(Pikulina & Renneboog, 2017). Specifically, the following question was asked after the financial
knowledge testing: “what do you perceive your investment abilities to be in comparison to your
peers?” Finally, in step 2, I used Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA) with ProMax oblique
rotations to obtain correlations among the responses to investment level choices.
Overconfidence was measured by the CBO score, which is the difference between the
participants’ average confidence in their answers to the test and the actual correct answers they
gave (Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017), and BtA, or an over placement of a subjects’ assessment
of their financial knowledge and abilities being better than the other private equity fund and
investment managers comprising the sample. Both over-estimation and over-placement refer to
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an inclination to over-estimate performance either in comparison with the actual performance or
with the performance of their peers (Pikulina & Renneboog, 2017). This study further researched
overconfidence employing the use of the difference between the participant’s belief in their
competitive abilities in M&A negotiations and their years’ work experience and their actual
competency.
After measuring ability and overconfidence using a financial knowledge test comprised
of 20 questions, the participants were asked to make investment choices in a set of different
investment projects (average investment choice - RISK), in which their payoff depended on their
financial knowledge, their skill, and their choice of investment’s risk level (Pikulina &
Renneboog, 2017). The average choice of RISK is equal to the participant’s investment level in
their choice of the experiment (transaction). Out of 32 participants, 15 overestimated their test
scores and thought more highly of their capabilities.
To quantify skills, I used performance on a financial knowledge test and compared this to
participants assessment and assignment of the likelihood that their perception of their
performance is correct. The M&A professionals averaged 58% correct answers. The higher the
average confidence level of the private equity fund manager and investment fund professionals,
the higher their respective performance on the financial knowledge test was.
CBO was used to investigate whether subjective confidence levels accurately reflect
participant performance (Michailova, 2010; Pikulina, 2017). The CBO is the difference between
a subject’s average confidence in their answers and the actual number of correct answers
reported. Positive values of CBO indicate that the subjects’ confidence in their financial
knowledge is higher than actual performance and that the participants believed they had more
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correct answers than they did – in other words, they were overconfident (Pikulina & Renneboog,
2017). A negative CBO value implied that the subject underestimated their financial knowledge.
After taking the financial knowledge test, most participants appeared to be overconfident
in their choice of risk level taken on the investment experiments. Interestingly, overconfidence
was the case for most male participants but not female participants. This aligned with Beckmann
and Menkhoff (2008) findings in their 649 participants survey (124 women financial experts). A
female Asian American participant scored 100% on the financial knowledge test and was very
competitive on her achieved ROI in the experiment she participated in. Private equity and
investment fund managers and investment managers CBO scores appeared to be better calibrated
due to their higher performance than their peers (SEC lawyers, investment bankers, and family
office investors) in the sample. The sample groups’ average CBO of 0.03 was above zero.
Before conducting the experiments, an empirical comparison of the subjective average
investment choice or risk level to the subjects’ actual skill level was mad. When participants
drew numbers from a hat to pair teams, the first to select their number was designated as the
buyer in the experiment (transaction) and the second as the seller. As expected, the private equity
fund managers had higher skill levels than other M&A professionals (i.e., SEC lawyers,
investment bankers, and family office investors). Finally, the use of BtA in this research
employed the use of Alicke’s (2005) definition: “the better than average effect pertains to selfversus average per comparisons on behavior and trait dimensions whereas optimistic bias
involves comparison about life events such as winning the lottery and getting divorced" (p. 85).
Experiment 4 was incorporated into the research to attain information on those
participants who may be risk averse. Risk averse was defined Markowitz (1952) as “when the
investor receives more utility from the actuarial value of a gamble obtained with certainty than

55

form the gamble itself” (p. 77). Risk aversion behavior is often a reflection of economic cycles,
political uncertainty, age, and even cultural factors (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 2006). I was
interested to assess whether risk aversion is symptom of a lack of skills level, under-confidence
in capability, or reflective of the participant’s age.
Experiment Setting
32 private equity and M&A investment professionals were grouped in three cohorts (1212-8). The experiments were conducted using a sequential series of Zoom calls. Two participants
engaged by assuming the role of either a buyer or seller as a pair after randomly assigned their
roles. In addition, they chose one of four simulated investment acquisition transactions
(experiments). The acquisition or investment transactions included distinctions of varying risk
levels and potential ROIs, specifically for behavioral interactions during the decision-making and
purchase/sale negotiations.
To more closely examine the inter-relationships and glean a deeper understanding of the
mediating and moderating variables influences, I utilized experiments similar to game theory
games with 29 purposefully selected private equity and investment fund managers M&A
professionals participating in one of the four experiments to realistically simulate business
transaction contexts and conditions. Three participants played roles in the experiments twice,
rendering permutations of: (29 x 1) + (3 x 2) = 32 data points.
Stratified data were collected for demographics and control variables, including skill
level, gender, educational attainment, and years of work experience to examine the differences in
behavioral responses among the groups.
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Experiment Objective
In step 1 of the experiment, the research sought to ascertain the individual’s actual
competence level versus their belief in their skills. The level of overconfidence was measured
with BtA, or when the participants believed their skills were superior to others, and with
excessive optimism (overestimation), or when the participants perceived their ability,
achievements, and or control to be higher because of their perception that they have better than
average skills level (Moore & Healy, 2008). This behavior distinguished itself in the
participant’s overestimation of their accurate answers on the financial knowledge test compared
to their actual performance and that of the other sample groups’ participants.
Experimental Design
An experiment is used to extract answers to the cause and effect and how they relate to
one another (Field, 2018). I sought to examine the impact of the IVs on the DVs using an
experiment design, that included random selection and pairing of 32 purposefully selected
participants were placed into two cohorts of 12 and one cohort of eight M&A professionals.
They participated in one of the four 2-persons game theory experiments. These experiments
simulated the investment/acquisition of private companies. The experiments were implemented
in two steps in three Zoom calls.
I assessed participant’s skills and overconfidence in investments (acquisitions) by asking
them to complete a 20 question financial aptitude test. The participants were asked to choose a
correct answer from multiple choices. There was no time limit to complete the test. The
individual participants were asked to assign the probability of their answers being correct after
the financial knowledge test and before the actual experiments were conducted. One-half of each
cohort (50%) were verbally advised of their test scores. They functioned as the control group.
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The control group was monitored for excessive overconfidence resulting from their being
cognizant of their performance. Their performance was compared to the non-control groups
financial knowledge test scores and ROI results during the statistical analysis. All 32 participants
were asked to rank their skills and their test scores. The participant’s average probability of
answering the questions correctly corresponded to their subjective confidence level in their
financial knowledge skill ranking (Pikulina & Renneboog, 2017).
All participants were then asked to make investment decisions using one of four
simulated M&A transactions, which included distinct degrees of risk and ROIs. The four distinct
investment scenarios concerned overconfidence bias, advantage, lying for strategic advantage,
and cooperation versus non-cooperation. Their economic payoff depended on their investment
level in their respective investment choice (risk level) and skills shown and paying the right price
resulting from their negotiations in the first portion of the experiment. Valuation metrics were
embodied in the content of each experiment/transaction that enabled the participants to calculate
a plausible purchase price. The participants’ economic payoff was maximized when they made
investment decisions relative to a risk level that was congruent with their actual skill level.
Regarding the experiments, in each transaction, the participant's potential reward
depended on their respective skillsets and the amount they invested and the ROI derived from it.
The payoff was maximum when the participants made investment decisions equal to their
achieved skills level findings (Holt & Laury, 2002; Pikulina & Renneboog, 2017). Their
economic payoff depended on their investment level in their respective investment choice (risk
level) and skills shown and paying the right price resulting from their negotiations. Valuation
metrics were embodied in the content of each experiment / transaction that enabled the
participants to calculate a plausible purchase price in which to maximize their ROIs.
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16 participants were told what the assessment of their investment skills was, forming the
control group. The control groups financial test results, skills level, and ROIs were statistically
compared to the non-control group who were apprised of their skills level to validate or
invalidated their skills levels and tenets of: overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and cooperation versus non-cooperation.
Once the participants were paired they were secluded into a virtual breakout room in
which they collaboratively choose the experiment that they wanted to work on. Each buyer
(investor) was given an endowment of $5 million to invest in a chosen transaction from four
experiments simulating various levels of risk and ROI. The participants were told that they were
allowed to “leverage up” senior debt (3:1) to pursue a larger acquisition transaction. Each seller
was given the pre-money value of their company and the initial capitalization to have a
benchmark from which to negotiate a sale. Participants were assigned a role to lie about certain
facts or co-operate versus non co-operate in the negotiating process. Each seller was given a
company valuation to achieve on the sale of their company. Similarly, each seller was assigned a
role to act overconfident, lie about certain facts, or co-operate / non co-operate in the negotiating
process.
Each participant was instructed that their objective was to maximize their ROI through
decision-making and interaction in negotiating while exhibiting their inherent traits (via their
assigned roles). Levels of ROI were spread across each of the four experiments
investment/acquisition transactions simulating (a) a mediocre transaction, (b) a high risky
transaction) a high yield transaction, and (d) acquisition of a company for synergies without
significant cash flow (i.e., risk avoidance). For more details on the basic instructions participants
were given, see Appendix B.
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The four basic transactions simulated acquisition/investment transactions were designed
with different degrees of risk and ROI and presented to the participants with the four embedded
factors. To guarantee an optimal investment choice level for each participant’s skills level, the
revenue function was constructed such that earnings = revenues + endowment - the cost of the
investment (Pikulina & Renneboog, 2017). Their economic payoff depended on their investment
level in their respective investment choice (risk level) and skills shown and paying the right price
resulting from their negotiations.
The participants’ economic payoff was maximized when they made investment decisions
congruent with their actual skill level, years’ work experience. Earnings were at the highest only
when the chosen investment level equals a participant’s actual skill level. Underestimating and
overestimating one’s skill can lead to sub-optimal investment selections (Pikulina & Renneboog,
2017). The context scenarios included bias and rational and irrational behaviors showing
overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and cooperation versus noncooperation. For a
complete overview of the four experiments, please see Appendix B.
Final Payment
Before subjects received feedback about their performance, I collected the participants’
risk preferences (choice of risk level chosen), demographic characteristics, and beliefs about
their skill level and those of their peers. Post experiment, the participants were given the data on
their actual earnings in each investment (acquisition) transaction/experiment. So that the
competition for the $1,500 prize was fair to those participants who played one game, one
investment transaction (experiment) was selected to calculate each participant’s final earnings.
Subsequently, I computed the participants’ last earnings and determined the winner with the
highest ROI.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Data Analysis and Measurement of Operation via Experiments Results
Four experiments were used to test the three hypotheses for private equity fund and
investment fund manager’s (buyers’) overconfidence behavior, lying for strategic advantage, and
cooperation/noncooperation throughout acquisition negotiations and investment decision-making
and how these IVs individually, or in combination, impact or effect an increase of the premium
price paid for a company and the ROI achieved by a buyer by a buyer for a targeted private
company acquisition.
The quantitative data collected from the four-game theory simulated investment
transactions/experiments were used for testing with inferential statistics and OLS regression
analysis those relationships. These methods led to confirming or rejecting the three buyerfocused hypotheses:
§

H1: When overconfidence bias is exhibited by an M & A professional (buyer) in
investment decision-making, it increases the premium price paid for a private company
acquisition, thus decreasing the ROI.

§

H2: When lying for strategic advantage is used by an M & A professional (buyer) in
M&A, it reduces the premium price paid for the private company acquisition, thus
decreasing the ROI for the transaction.

§

H3: Noncooperation between an M & A professional (buyer) and a private company
seller increases the premium price paid for the purchase price of a private company and
diminishes the ROI for the transaction.

EFA and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) are techniques for identifying clusters of related
variables (Field, 2018). These methods were used along with linear regression analyses to depict
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conditional probabilities. When regressions analysis was conducted, collinearity was present
among several of the IVs. I used EFA and PCA techniques because they serve three primary
goals: (1) understanding the numerical relationship structure of a set of variables, (2) using
“EFA” to examine more closely the construction of the experiments to measure the underlying
variables, and (3) reducing the number of variables to a more manageable size while retaining as
much information as possible (Fields, 2018). I employed EFA with Promax and oblique rotations
to reduce the set of the explanatory variables to a smaller set of dimensions referred to as factors
and components. Factor analysis was used to explain the maximum variance in a correlation
matrix with the smallest number of explanatory constructs (variables). These explanatory
constructs are latent variables or factors and they represent a cluster of variables correlated with
others. Finally, I used PCA to explain the maximum total variance using a correlation matrix by
transforming the original variables into linear components.
The correlation matrix (Table 7) shows a Promax rotation of EFA which demonstrated a
strong correlation between correct answers on the financial knowledge test and skill level, r =
.942 (p < .001) and financial test score .941 (p < .001). Further, the CBO score was strongly
correlated to the number of correct answers -.629 (p <.001) and skill level -.490 (p < .001).
Additionally, years of work experience was found to be negatively correlated to the financial
knowledge test score -.353 (p < .05). The KMO Bartlett’s test of sampling adequacy was .56,
above the 0.5 suggested level as a minimum requirement for sampling adequacy.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------A one-way ANOVA was used to assess whether a significant mean difference exists
between the participant groups consisting of four groups: private fund managers, family office
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investment managers, SEC lawyers, and investment bankers. Results of ANOVA revealed that
there were no significant differences in BtA, F (3,28) = 3.01, p = .05, and CBO, F (3,28) = 2.24,
p = .11, amongst the four groups of occupation (Table 2).
Testing for Confirmation of H1
Overconfidence was measured using CBO, BtA, and the performance-based measure
skill level coupled with years’ work experience. They were tested for their respective economic
impacts on the purchase price paid (dependent variables = premium price paid and ROI) for the
acquisition of a privately held target company for acquisition.
Simple linear and OLS regression models weas used to predict the relationships between
the overconfidence and the DVs. In these four simulated acquisition transactions, 32 participants
engaged in the experiments, buyers (n = 16) and sellers (n = 16). However, in two experiments,
the participants failed to conclude a result (n = 14). Before running the regressions, Pearson
correlations were conducted to determine which demographic variables should be controlled for
in the analysis. Premium price paid was not significantly correlated with gender, occupation,
years of work experience, or educational attainment. Additionally, ROI was not significantly
correlated with gender, occupation, years’ work experience, or educational attainment.
Consequently, these demographic variables were not controlled for in the regressions.
To quantify their actual skill level, each participant’s performance on the 20-question
financial knowledge test was administered on the Qualtrics platform and one-on-one during a
Zoom call. In addition, half the participants were advised of their skill level performance after
they took the test. Participants were told that a prize of $1,500 would be given to the participant
with the highest ROI on their acquisition transaction. ROIs are based on the choice of level of
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risk in the investment that support the participants engagement in their selection of experiments
(transaction).
Table 5 compares the average skill level assigned to the participants in each of the four
experiments and the corresponding subjective choice level of risk that they undertook based
upon the participants' biased assessment of their skills. Interestingly, the average skill level for
the high yield investment/experiment was 2.89. Participants with financial knowledge test scores
between 60-69% constituted the crux of the buyers/sellers in the high yield experiment while
participants with the higher skill level (3.5) focused on the risky experiment (transaction).
Table 7 presents the study’s experiments participants’ statistical summary, by gender, of
the 32 participants’ number of correct answers, confidence level, CBO scores, and BtA. The
number of correct answers to the financial knowledge test of females (M = 16.33, SD = 2.34)
was higher than that of males (M = 14.23, SD = 2.89). Lastly, majority of males (n =18, 69.2%)
had a higher perception of themselves being BtA than the female participants (n = 4, 66%).
Table 8 presents the consolidation of correlation of the predictor's skill level, CBO score,
BtA, and years of work experience with ROI. The Pearson’s correlation analysis revealed that
skill level and ROI have a significant positive correlation (r = .473, p = .011). This indicates that
as the skill level increases, the ROI also increases. In addition, the results showed that skill level
and CBO score have a significant negative correlation (r = -.490, p = .004). This indicates that as
the skill level increases, the CBO score also increases. Lastly, the results revealed no significant
correlation between CBO score and ROI. The variables age, gender, and work experience did not
differentiate themselves from one another, as expected. The second table presents the Pearson
correlation analysis among BtA, skill level, years’ work experience against overall ROI. The
results showed that skill level positively correlated with overall ROI (r = .473, p = .011). This

64

indicates that as the skill level increases, so does the overall ROI. Meanwhile, the results also
showed that years of work experience had a significant negative correlation between the ROI of
those who overpaid (r = -.805, p = .016). This indicates that as the years of work experience of
those who overpaid increases, the ROI decreases. The is contrary to other authors findings, likely
due to the lack of would have size of the experiments’ participants. Had there been greater age
diversity amongst the participants, then there may have been a greater difference in years of
work experience.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------Table 9 depicts the regression result of predicting the impact upon ROI using the IVs
skill level, CBO score, and years of work experience of males. The regression model was not
found to be a good fit of the data F(3,18) = 2.925, p = ns and consequently had a low R2 (.216).
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------Table 10 presents the regression results focused on the buyers predicting average
investment (risk-taking) using gender, age, and years of work experience as predictors. The
regression model with the three predictors was significant, F (3, 24) = 3.707, p = .025 but had a
low adjusted R2 (.231). However, no significant predictors of average investment were found
amongst gender, age, and years of work experience.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------Four multiple linear regression models were developed to test Hypothesis 1. The DVs
were the premium price paid and ROI, while the IVs were CBO, BtA, skill level, and years of
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work experience. Moreover, control variables (age, education, gender, and ethnicity) were tested
for significance in predicting the DVs, but none were significant. Refer to Table 11 for the
results for the four regression models that were developed to test this hypothesis.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------H1 Regression Results
The first regression model (Table 11, Column 1) used CBO score, skill level, and years of
work experience as IVs and premium price paid as the DV. The regression model was found not
to be a good fit of the data, F (3,10) = 3.61, p = ns, with an adjusted R2 of .378. However, it was
found that both skill level (p = .021) and years of work experience (p = .011) were significant
predictors of premium price paid. Both had a negative relationship with the premium price paid.
The second regression model (Table 11, Column 2) was with BtA, skill level, and years
of work experience as IVs and premium price paid as the DV. The regression model was found
not to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 3.71, p = .050, with an adjusted R2 of .385. However, it
was found that both skill level (p = .020) and years of work experience (p = .010) were
significant predictors of the premium price paid. Both had a negative relationship with the
premium price paid.
The third regression model (Table 11, Column 3) was with CBO score, skill level, and
years of work experience as IVs and ROI as the DV. The regression model was found not to be a
good fit of the data, F (3,10) = 1.08, p = ns, with an adjusted R2 of .018.
The fourth regression model (Table 11, Column 4) was with BtA, skill level, and years of
work experience as IVs and ROI as the DV. The regression model was found not to be a good fit
of the data, F (3,10) = 1.08, p = ns, with an adjusted R2 of .018.
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Findings Summary for H1
1. Skill level was a significant predictor of the premium price paid. An increase in skill
level has a corresponding decrease in the premium price paid.
2. Years of work experience was a significant predictor of the premium price paid. An
increase in years of work experience has a corresponding decrease in the premium
price paid.
3. CBO score and BtA were not significant predictors of either premium price paid or
ROI.
Test for Confirmation of H2
To test hypothesis 2, a working definition for each of lying for strategic advantage,
deception, and misrepresentation was needed. The following were used:
§ Gaining an information advantage by learning the opponent’s preferences without
revealing your preferences (Gratch et al., 2016).
§ Identifying a false set of preferences to communicate to one’s opponent that 1)
maximize one’s reward from a negotiation, 2) subject to the constraint that the other
party believes the negotiated agreement or price to be fair and efficient.
In three of the four simulated investment experiments (2, 3, and 4), I embedded diverse
motivations for lying to gain strategic advantage, deception, and non-co-operation by the buyer
or seller in a simple ultimate bargain game. The games included deception by the seller regarding
the private company's sale price (valuation) over which they were negotiating. Furthermore, I
empirically verified the use of deception by re-watching the recorded Zoom videos to look for
the buyer's explicit verbal communication of their price allocation together with their offer

67

(valuation), and comparing their actions to implicit deception, whereby the buyer conveys such
information solely through their offers (Gneezy, 2011).
H2 Regression Results
The first regression model developed to test hypothesis 2 was for buyers only using lying
for strategic advantage, skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and premium price paid
as the DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F (3,10) = 5.20, p = .024,
with an adjusted R2 of .493. It was found that both skill level (p = .007) and years of work
experience (p = .004) are significant predictors of premium paid the price among buyers. Both
have a negative relationship with the premium price paid.
The second regression model was for sellers only using lying for strategic advantage,
skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and premium price paid as the DV. The
regression model was found not to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = .19, p = ns.
The third regression model reflects the buyers’ choice in the experiment using lying for
strategic advantage, skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and ROI as the DV. The
regression model was found not to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 1.51, p = ns.
Lastly, the fourth regression model was for sellers only using lying for strategic
advantage, skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and ROI as the DV. The regression
model was found not to be a good fit of the data, F (3,10) = 1.39, p = ns.
Findings Summary for Hypothesis 2
1. Skill level and years of work experience were significant predictors of the premium
price paid for buyers.
2. Lying for strategic advantage was not a significant predictor of premium paid the price
or ROI for both buyers and sellers.
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Test for Confirmation of H3
All four experiments were conducted, with the 28 unique participants engaged in the
game theory structured experiments. Four of the 28 participants participated in more than one
experiment, in which their assignment was noncooperation roles or lying for strategic advantage,
a form of deception. Deception occurred more often amongst the sellers. This over-assigning of
participants to roles also occurred because a key for each transaction centered on the seller's
motivation to sell and their perception of the company's value.
Furthermore, roles were assigned in which participants' intended actions were
implemented with noise (i.e., meaningless information that did not benefit either buyer or seller).
In a few cases, such as in experiment 4 concerning the Netflix stock transaction, the buyer and
seller colluded to achieve a mutually beneficial economic outcome. In this example, they agreed
to share a commission of 75% to the buyer and 25% to the broker.
The research goals for testing H3 were to (a) understand whether and when the
participants cooperated or not, (b) develop a sense of strategies that participants used, and (c)
determine if the cooperation or noncooperation impacted the outcome of the sale price and if the
buyer over or underpaid.
OLS was used to examine the impact of the two IVs, noncooperation and asymmetrical
information sharing's effects, on each DV. In addition, OLS linear regression analysis was used
to examine whether the buyers' or sellers' lack of cooperation and not sharing crucial information
relative to the pending sale of a private company impacted the economic outcome. That is,
whether the buyer over-paid or under-paid for the target private company acquisition.
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H3 Regression Results
The first regression model developed to test hypothesis 3 was for buyers using noncooperation, skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and the premium price paid as the
DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 4.31, p = .034, with
an adjusted R2 of .433. It was found that both skill level (p = .015) and years of work experience
(p = .007) are significant predictors of premium paid the price among buyers.
The second regression model was for buyers only used interaction between lying and
cooperation, skill level, and years of work experience as IVs and the premium price as paid as
the DV. The regression model was found to be a good fit of the data, F(3,10) = 7.05, p = .008,
with an adjusted R2 of .583. It was found that interact (p = .045), skill level (p = .002), and years
of work experience (p = .001) are significant predictors of premium paid the price among buyers.
All three have negative relationships with the premium price paid.
Findings Summary for Hypothesis 3
1. Skill level and years’ work of experience were significant predictors of buyers'
premium price.
2. Interact was a significant predictor of the premium price paid for buyers.
3. Further, female participants openly shared transaction information that leveled the
playing field for both buyers and sellers
Empirical Observations
Empirical observations using recorded video (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009), suggest the noncooperative strategy as inferior to the strategy chosen by most buyers, which was to cooperate.
This is supported by the debriefing feedback that I received from the four participants whom
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negotiated in experiment 3. Participant 21 remarked, “the selling effort without cooperation in
disclosing underlying facts and figures eroded trust and triggered the need for more due diligence
of the purchase”. Participant 20 stated, when asked about non-cooperation versus cooperation,
“non-cooperation caused the perception that the parties were not aligned in their respective
desires to buy / sale the asset. A transparency approach always leads to a long-term partnership”.
Further, cooperation was more frequent among the older, more experienced male investment
professionals. They disregarded their instructions not to cooperate and immediately agreed to
share transaction information so that they could attain an agreement more quickly and win the
$1,500 price for the highest ROI.
The central focus of these four hypotheses was to contrast rational and bounded rational
behavior in making acquisition decisions. I posit that overconfidence, lying for strategic
advantage, and cooperation / non-cooperation are all fundamental drivers that influence
acquisition decisions and partial to the economic forces and financial analysis favoring the
acquisition of private companies. The vulnerability of judgment biases in a private equity and
investment fund manager's strategy, the perception of the risk involved, and mispricing
negotiated bargaining with the seller for acquiring a private company have become increasingly
complicated and sophisticated. Thus, it can be argued that private equity fund managers can form
a more rational and dynamic strategy by applying extension-based game theory tools that
incorporate behavior analysis of overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and
noncooperation in acquisition decision-making.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Problem Addressed
The primary questions addressed in this research was: “Does cognitive bias in private
equity and investment fund managers’ behavior, manifested as overconfidence, lying for
strategic advantage and the interaction between lying and non-cooperation, have an economic
impact upon the purchase price for the acquisition of a private company? If so, does it impact the
return on investment?”
Research Questions
1) How does a private equity or investment fund manager’s (buyer’s) bias behavior impact
the purchase price premium paid in an M&A transaction for a private company?
2) Can the buyer's employment of strategies such as lying for strategic advantage and
cooperation versus noncooperation during negotiations be used tactically by a private
equity and investment fund manager (buyers) to diminish the seller's price expectations in
an acquisition transaction of a private company?
Significance of the Proposed Research
The significance of this study is that prior results have focused on the overconfidence of
the CEOs of public companies and their stock trader's mentality. These authors have considered
the impact on a company's stock prices by examining the overconfident CEOs deferring the
exercise of their stock options to a later date because of their confidence in their leadership abilities
(Malmendier & Tate, 2015). Smit and Moraitis (2010) examined judgment biases. However, other
scholars have examined irrational behavior in a game theory context but with student participants
(Agarwal, 2011). At the time of this study, no researchers have published results concerning the
premium prices paid for private companies resulting from the impact of a private equity fund and
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investment fund manager’s overconfident bias behavior and their employment of the use of lying
for strategic advantage and or cooperation versus noncooperation.
Summary of Findings for H1 - Overconfidence
I investigated how individuals’ confidence in their abilities affects their bias in decisionmaking behaviors and willingness to take risks of varying degrees through acquisitions and
prudent investment tactics. The regression analysis conducted did not support this proposition.
Congruent with my monetary incentives, most participants accurately estimated their skill levels.
However, several of the participants in the four experiments with substantially lower skill levels
than their peers misjudged their abilities. These participants took on higher risk than their
respective skill levels. The four experiments exemplified that skill level is advantageous and
predictably leads to accurate investment risk levels and of premium price paid for a private
company acquisition.
Additionally, eight of the experiments’ participants over-paid for their acquisitions, while
18 participants, 56%, appropriately choose their investment risk levels based on their skill level
and ultimately under-paid for the company they acquired or sold. The remaining six persons paid
actual value for their acquisitions based on the valuation metrics provided the participants.
The regression results of the four experiments demonstrated that private equity and
investment fund managers’ performance reasonably resulted in higher-than-average confidence
in their financial knowledge due to their years of professional work experience. Findings
revealed that years of work experience was a significant predictor of the premium price paid. An
increase in years of work experience would have a corresponding decrease in the premium price
paid. Additionally, skill level was a significant predictor of the premium price paid by the
buyers. An increase in skill level would have a corresponding decrease in premium price paid.
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H1 was not validated by the CBO score and BtA was not a significant predictor of either
premium price paid or ROI. This result may be attributed to the small sample of 32 participants
being an adequate size to support sufficient G*Power in many tests.
Summary of findings for Hypothesis 2
The regression model developed to test H2 was for buyers only with lying for strategic
advantage, skill level, and years of work experience as independent variables and premium price
paid as the dependent variable. It was found that both skill level (p = .007) and years of work
experience (p = .004) are significant predictors of premium paid.
The subsequent regression analysis of the same predictors for the premium price paid and
ROI results demonstrated that there were no significant predictors of premium paid.
Consequently, H #2 was not validated.
Video recorded evidence from empirical observation (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009) of the
experiments confirmed that the more confidence the participants had, the less likely they were to
rely on lying for strategic advantage. Although there was moderate tactical use of lying for
strategic advantage amongst the participants, it was observed and recorded by the researcher that
the six women participants in the experiments were less likely to lie and more likely to cooperate
in negotiations. Although it was not reflected in the regression analysis, empirical observations
were recorded by me, noting that the private equity and investment fund managers (buyers n =
16) lied when they expected the lie could cost them little in terms of credibility with the
opposing participant in the negotiations. It was further observed that lying ended up helping the
sellers of the companies in the experiments. Empirical observation via recorded video did
demonstrate that private equity and investment fund managers in the experiments lied
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significantly more when they perceived a more considerable gain through lying. These
observations are consistent with Ariely’s (2008) observations.
I recorded empirical observations and noted that female participants were more likely to
lie when the lie hurt the sender (seller) a little but helped the receiver (buyer) a lot. 24 of the
buyers and sellers did not lie even when lying resulted in a pareto improvement. In other words,
inputs from the seller and outputs from the buyers in the communication process are not
balanced, and that the buyers are sensitive to the communication process and the buyers'
cost/benefit associated with lying.
Summary of findings for H 3 - Cooperation vs. Noncooperation
My empirical observations (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009) that were recorded demonstrated that
the non-co-operative strategy employed by the buyers in the experiments' four acquisition
transactions was inferior to the strategy to cooperate with the seller.
The regression analyses indicate that skill level and years’ work of experience were both
significant predictors of the premium price paid for buyers, and that the interaction between
lying for strategic advantage and non-cooperation was a significant predictor of the premium
price paid for buyers. Additionally, empirical observation showed that cooperation was more
frequent among the older, more experienced male investment professionals. They disregarded
their instruction not to cooperate and immediately agreed to share transaction information so that
they could attain an agreement more quickly and win the $1,500 price for the highest ROI.
I suggest that the participants who exhibited their behaviors might be guided by
opportunism, self-esteem, and risk-taking character. The more cooperation between the buyer
participants who cooperated in the acquisition price negotiations the lower premium purchase
price paid by the private equity fund manager (buyer). Empirical observation distinguished that
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cooperation was more frequent among the older experienced participants and women than the
younger less experienced participants. The participants in the four experiments exhibited
Fudenberg’s (2012) suggestions of outcomes occurring in repeated games (experiments) with a
known and constant probability that interaction could continue between the participants
following each round.
Conclusions
All facts combined from the regression analyses, descriptive data, and empirical
observations did not support the validation of H1 and H2. However, the regression analysis for
the validation of H3 supports the fact that skill level and years of work experience resulted in
lower premium prices being paid which result in higher ROIs on the acquisitions made. Thus,
skill level and years’ work experience are significant predictors of the premium price paid for
acquiring a private company.
The review of literature distinguishes that overconfidence often can lead to sub-optimal
choices in cases with high-risk stakes in the context of investment decision-making. For
example, overestimation of one's abilities leads to excess entry into competitive transactions.
Overconfident individual participants in the experiments overestimated their ability to select
good quality investment transactions. As a result, they often over-paid to purchase a private
company which considerably reduced their ROIs. All these findings suggest that biased
overconfidence and irrational behaviors of lying for strategic advantage and noncooperation had
less impact on decision-making than I had expected.
Implications for Advancing Theory
The concept of measuring behavioral interactions in the four experiments constructed to
simulate decision-making behavior illustrates the economic importance of understanding
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overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and cooperation versus non-co-operation in
acquisition negotiations and decision-making by private equity and investment fund managers. In
addition, the analysis identified those participants with financial knowledge and skills levels that
did not need to employ such behavior versus those who did and employed the strategies to attain
economic benefit.
Theoretical Frameworks
Theoretical frameworks start with investigating the relationship between variables and
evaluating existing theories to build a blueprint for a dissertation inquiry (Miles et al., 2014). I
chose a thematic approach to writing this literature review. The thematic structures that I
examined were patterns in the literature that are more pronounced than others, central themes,
and evidence of these themes.
Implications for Business Practice
I have no intention of publishing this dissertation. Hence, it is doubtful there are
implications in business practices in the greater business community. However, I have gained
more knowledge than when first entering my DBA program. Undoubtedly, I will enlist this
knowledge in future negotiations with partners as they navigate through the acquisition process
with sellers. In addition, likely, I will share findings with other private equity fund managers and
investment managers with whom I am close.
Limitations
From the final IRB approval date, this research study was in peril because of the IRB
restrictions placed upon the researcher from conducting the experiments live. The original filing
had indicated that the Health Department regulations in San Diego County allowed for outdoor
dining for up to 75% capacity of a facility. The IRB deemed this was not allowable because of
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the restrictions imposed by Los Angeles County Health Department, where the campus is
located, which had more severe restrictions. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic placed a
burden on the busy schedules of the 32 M&A professionals as such as it was difficult to maintain
the participants’ continued involvement in the experiments for follow questions and comments.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants
N
Gender:
Male
Female
Occupation
PE Mgrs.
Fam. OM
SEC Law
Inv. Banker
Yrs. Exper.
Edu. Attain.
Fin. Test
score
Corr. answers
Skill level

Min

Max

M

SD

Premium Price
Correlation
.303(p = .117)

ROI
Correlation
.173(p = .379)

16(50.0%)
6(18.8%)
7(21.9%)
3(9.4%)
32
32
32

9
4
35%

38
9
100%

23.16
6.53
73.97%

9.17
1.29
41.30%

-.187 (p = .340)
-.179(p = .361)
-.206(p = .294)

-.103(p = .603)
.097(p = .624)
.473(p = .011)

32

7

20

14.63

2.88

-.203(p = .301)

.482(p = .009)

32

1

5

3.19

1.12

-.196(p = .316)

.473(p = .011)

26(81.3%)
6 (18.8%)

Table 2
Participants Summary Statistics by Gender

Correct Answers
Confidence Level
CBO Score

Gender

N

Mean

SD

Male

26

14.63

2.89

Female

6

Male

26

75.96

11.32

Female

6

81.67

10.33

Male

26

0.048

0.099

0.000

0.04

Female
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16.33

2.34

Table 3
ANOVA Results for BtA and CBO score by Occupation

Occupation
PE fund managers Family office
investment
managers
SEC lawyers
Investment
bankers
Family office
PE fund managers
investment
SEC lawyers
managers
Investment
bankers
SEC lawyers
PE fund managers
Family office
investment
managers
Investment
bankers
Investment
PE fund managers
bankers
Family office
investment
managers
SEC lawyers

BtA
F (3,28) = 3.01, p = .05
Mean
SE Sig.
Difference
0.15
0.21 1.00

CBO
F (3,28) = 2.24, p = .11
Mean
SE Sig.
Difference
-0.10
0.04 0.13

0.53
-0.19

0.20 0.07
0.27 1.00

-0.03
-0.08

0.04 1.00
0.06 1.00

-0.15
0.38
-0.33

0.21 1.00
0.24 0.74
0.30 1.00

0.10
0.07
0.03

0.04 0.13
0.05 0.89
0.06 1.00

-0.53
-0.38

0.20 0.07
0.24 0.74

0.03
-0.07

0.04 1.00
0.05 0.89

-0.71

0.30 0.14

-0.05

0.06 1.00

0.19
0.33

0.27 1.00
0.30 1.00

0.08
-0.03

0.06 1.00
0.06 1.00

0.71

0.30 0.14

0.05

0.06 1.00

Table 4
Number of Correct Answers and Assigned Skill Level

Skill Level

10 or less
12-13
14-15
16-17
(<50%)
(60-69%) (70-79%) (80-89%)
1
2
3
4
Note. 32 participants (16 buyers, 16 sellers)

92

18+
(90% +)
5

Table 5
Average Skill Level for Each Experiment Type
Mediocre Risky High Yield Loss Aversion
Choice Exp. #
1
2
3
4
Average skill level
3.27
3.5
2.89
3.25
Note. 32 participants (16 buyers, 16 sellers)

Table 6
Behavior vs Outcomes Summary
N
%
Paid actual value 6 18.8%
Over paid
8 25.0%
Under paid
18 56.3%
Note. 32 participants (16 buyers, 16 sellers)

Table 7
Correlations from EFA
BtA
BtA

+Answers ROI/choice Education Skill lev. Fin. Test CBO Score
.053

.045

.228

-.008

.046

.251

.209

.297

-.205

.941**

-.490**

Gender

-.022

.289

.173

-.137

Skill level

-.008

.942**

.473*

.040

CBO score

.251

-.629**

-.115

.157

-.490**

-.629**

Work exp.

-.190

-.379*

-.103

.096

-.456**

-.353*

.023

ROI choice

.045

.482**

.097

.473*

.473*

-.115

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). KMO
Bartlett’s test = 0.56.
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Table 8
Correlations to Return on Investment
ROI/Invest choice
CBO score
Skill
ROI/Invest. choice
1.00
CBO score #
-.115 (p = .560)
1.00
Skill level
0.473 (p = .011) -.490 (p = .004) 1.00

Pearson correlations
ROI
Occupation

-.278 (p = .153)

BtA
Skill level
Years’ work experience

.045 (p = .819)
.473 (p = .011)
-.103 (p = .603)

Table 9
Regression Table for Skill Level, CBO, and Years’ Work Experience Predicting ROI
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficient

(Constant)
Skill level
CBO score
Years’ Work Exp

B
SE
-1.870 1.060
.526
.182
2.028 1.692
.037
.023

t

p

Collinearity
Statistics
Tolerance

Coefficient

Β
-1.764
2.893
1.198
1.621

.803
.287
.402

.095
.010
.246
.122

.485
.651
.609

2.061
1.536
1.643

*F (3, 18) = 2.925, p = .062 R2 adj = .216
Table 10
Regression Table for BtA Predicting Average Investment w/ Controls
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t
B
SE
β
(Constant)
33086527.20 52640275.66
.629
Gender (F = 1, M = 0)
96229409.25 37737094.93
.525
2.550
Years’ work experience -542038.660
1800046.68
-.062
-.301
BtA
9124829.870 28286298.67
.055
.323
2
*R adj = .231, F (3,24) = 3.707, p = .025
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VIF

p.
.536
.018
.766
.750

Table 11
Regression Results for Hypothesis 1
Part A.
Regression Results for H #1 (N = 16 buyers), regressing the independent variables: CBO score,
financial test score and Years’ work experience on Premium price paid. (Coefficients in
1,000,000s, Col 1 & 2)

CBO/

Col. # 1
Dep Var: Prem
Price t p
-2.43 (p = .678)

BtA

Col. # 2
Dep Var: Prem
Price t p

Col. # 3
Dep Var: ROI
t
p
.32 (p = .941)

-3.48 (p = .58)

Col. # 4
Dep Var: ROI
t
p
-.02 (p = .968)

Fin. Test

-90.5 (p = .021)

-91.9 (p = .020)

4.35 (p = .106)

4.34 (p = .108)

Years’ Work Exp

-1.37 (p = .011)

-1.43 (p = .010)

0.03 (p = .393)

0.03 (p = .410)

Constant

98.2 (p = .014)

-3.07 (p = .235)

-3.04 (p = .254)

F, R2adj

F (3,10) = 3.61,
R2adj = .376

100.30 (p =
.013)
F (3,10) = 3.71,
R2adj = .385

F (3,10) = 1.08,
R2adj = .018

F (3,10) = 1.08,
R2adj = .018

Part B.
Col. # 1. Coefficient results.
Premium price paid

Coefficient

Std. Err. t

t

p

CBO score

-2,300,000

56,800,000

0.678

-.43

Financial Test score

-9,500,000

33,200,000

0.021

-2.72

Yrs. work Experience

‐1,374,609

442,007.5

0.011

-3.11

_constant

98,200,000

33,000,000

0.014

2.98
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Part C.
Col. # 2. Coefficient results.
Prem. price paid

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t

p

Better than Avg.

‐3,481,579

5,981,109

‐0.58

0.573

Financial Test score

-91,900,000

33,100,000

‐2.78

0.020

Yrs. work Experience

‐1428535

Constant

449760.5

103,000,000

33,800,000

‐3.18

0.010

3.04

0.013

Column # 3. Coefficients from the Regress ROI / Invest Choice on: CBO score, Financial Test
score, Yrs. work Experience.
ROI Invest / Choice
CBO score|

Coefficient
.3191325

Std. Err.

t

p

4.189937

0.08

0.941

Financial Test score|

4.354762

2.447629

1.78

0.106

Yrs. work Exp.

290,727

.032579

0.89

0.393

‐3.071439

2.430135

‐1.26

0.235

Constant
Part D.

Column #4. Coefficients from the Regress ROI / Invest Choice on: BtA, Financial Test score
Yrs. work Experience
ROI Invest Choice

Coefficient

Better than Average

‐.0183313

Financial Test score

4.3389

Yrs. Work Exp.

.0287119

Constant

Std. Err.
.4443113
2.458382

‐3.036847

.0334108
2.511151
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t

p

‐0.04

0.968

1.76

0.108

0.86

0.410

‐1.21

0.254

APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER

Pepperdine University
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
TEL: 310-506-4000

NOTICE OF APPROVAL FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
Date: October 29, 2020
Protocol Investigator Name: Darryl Laws
Protocol #: 20-07-1408
Project Title: Irrational Behavior in Mergers and Acquisitions
School: Graziadio School of Business and Management
Dear Darryl Laws:
Thank you for submitting your application for exempt review to Pepperdine University's Institutional Review Board (IRB). We appreciate the work you have done on your
proposal. The IRB has reviewed your submitted IRB application and all ancillary materials. Upon review, the IRB has determined that the above entitled project meets the
requirements for exemption under the federal regulations 45 CFR 46.101 that govern the protections of human subjects.
Your research must be conducted according to the proposal that was submitted to the IRB. If changes to the approved protocol occur, a revised protocol must be reviewed
and approved by the IRB before implementation. For any proposed changes in your research protocol, please submit an amendment to the IRB. Since your study falls
under exemption, there is no requirement for continuing IRB review of your project. Please be aware that changes to your protocol may prevent the research from
qualifying for exemption from 45 CFR 46.101 and require submission of a new IRB application or other materials to the IRB.
A goal of the IRB is to prevent negative occurrences during any research study. However, despite the best intent, unforeseen circumstances or events may arise during the
research. If an unexpected situation or adverse event happens during your investigation, please notify the IRB as soon as possible. We will ask for a complete written
explanation of the event and your written response. Other actions also may be required depending on the nature of the event. Details regarding the timeframe in which
adverse events must be reported to the IRB and documenting the adverse event can be found in the Pepperdine University Protection of Human Participants in
Research: Policies and Procedures Manual at community.pepperdine.edu/irb.
Please refer to the protocol number denoted above in all communication or correspondence related to your application and this approval. Should you have additional
questions or require clarification of the contents of this letter, please contact the IRB Office. On behalf of the IRB, I wish you success in this scholarly pursuit.
Sincerely,
Judy Ho, Ph.D., IRB Chair
cc: Mrs. Katy Carr, Assistant Provost for Research

Page: 1
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Finance Knowledge Test Questions
This Finance Test is designed to help you assess your knowledge of important finance concepts,
terminology definitions, and frequently used calculations. The substance of the test is used to
determine your skill level in: finance including reading Financial Statements, Corporate Finance,
and Math for Corporate Finance. If you pass this test with 80% or above (16 questions or more),
it is likely that you have a strong background in finance.
•

•

•

•

1. The concept of present value relates to the idea that*
o The discount rate is always higher when you invest now than in the future
o The discount rate is always higher when you invest in the future than now
o The money you have now is worth less today than an identical amount you would
receive in the future
o The money you have now is worth more today than an identical amount you
would receive in the future
2. The formula for calculating future value (FV) is*
o FV = PV/(1+r)^n
o FV = PV/(1+r)*n
o FV = PV x (1+r)^n
o FV = PV x (1+r)*n
3. If you were able to earn interest at 3% and you started with $100, how much would
you have after 3 years?*
o $91.51
o $109.27
o $291.26
o $103.00
4. Based on the numbers given below, calculate the net present value (NPV) of this
project.*

59.06
459.47
230.00
205.36
5. What is an annuity?*
o An investment that has no definite end and a stream of cash payments that
continues forever
o A stream of cash flows that start one year from today and continue while growing
by a constant growth rate
o
o
o
o

•
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A series of equal payments at equal time periods and guaranteed for a fixed
number of years
o A series of unequal payments at equal time periods which are guaranteed for a
fixed number of years
6. Calculate the price of a dividend paying stock using the following information,
assuming the price is equal to the present value of all future dividends one will receive
from owning the stock. (Hint: treat the stock as a growing perpetuity)*
o

•

$37.50
$32.14
$42.60
$45.00
7. What is a par value of a bond?*
o The amount borrowed by the issuer of the bond and returned to the investors
when the bond matures
o The overall return earned by the bond investor when the bond matures
o The difference between the amount borrowed by the issuer of bond and the
amount returned to investors at maturity
o The size of the coupon investors receives on an annual basis
8. When the price of a bond is above the face value, the bond is said to be*
o Trading at par
o Trading at a premium
o Trading at a discount
o Trading below par
9. Which of the following is true when a bond is trading at a discount?*
o Coupon Rate > Current Yield > Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate < Current Yield < Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate = Current Yield = Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate < Current Yield = Yield to Maturity
10. The concept of time value of money is that*
o The cash flows that occur earlier are more valuable than cash flows that occur
later
o The cash flows that occur earlier are less valuable than cash flows that occur later
o The longer the time cash flows are invested, the more valuable they are in the
future
o The future value of cash flows is always higher than the present value of the cash
flows
o
o
o
o

•

•

•

•
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

11. What is the enterprise value of a business?*
o The market value of equity of the business
o The book value of equity of the business
o The entire value of the business without giving consideration to its capital
structure
o The entire value of the business considering its capital structure
12. Which of the following is the formula to calculate cost of capital?*
o Total assets/Net debt x Cost of debt + Total assets/Equity x Cost of equity
o Net debt/Equity x Cost of debt + Equity/Net debt x Cost of equity
o Net debt x Cost of debt + Equity x Cost of equity
o Net debt/Total assets x Cost of debt + Equity/Total assets x Cost of equity
13. Company A has a capital structure of $80M debt and $20M equity. This year, the
company reported a net income of $17M. What is Company A's return on equity?*
o 117.6%
o 21.3%
o 85.0%
o 28.3%
14. Which of the following is not an investment grade credit rating?*
o BB+
o BBB+
o BBB
o BBB15. Which of the following is not true about private equity funds?*
o Private equity funds are pools of capital invested in companies which represent an
opportunity for high rate of return
o Exit strategies for private equity funds include Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and
leveraged buyout (LBO)
o Venture capital is an example of private equity funds
o Private equity funds are usually invested for unlimited time periods
16. ____ underwriting commitment is when the underwriter agrees to buy the entire issue
and assume full financial responsibility for any unsold shares.*
o Best efforts
o Firm commitment
o All-or-none
o Full-purchase
17. The correct order of capital stack from the most to least secured is*
o Equity > Subordinated debt > Senior debt
o Subordinated debt > Senior debt > Equity
o Senior debt > Subordinated debt > Equity
o Senior debt > Equity > Subordinated debt
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•

•

•

18. Which of the following is not a financing activity?*
o Repayment of long-term debt
o Issuance of equity
o Investments in businesses
o Payment of dividends
19. What is working capital?*
o Equity Capital + Retained Earnings
o Equity Capital - Total Liabilities
o Total Assets - Total Liabilities
o Current Assets - Current Liabilities
20. Which of the following is not true about goodwill?*
o Goodwill needs to be evaluated for impairment yearly
o Goodwill is treated as a tangible asset in accounting
o Goodwill is a result of purchasing a company for a price higher than the fair
market value of the target company's net assets
o Goodwill can be comprised of things such as good reputation, loyal client base,
and brand recognition
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Answers to the Finance Knowledge Test Questions
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1. The concept of present value relates to the idea that*
o The discount rate is always higher when you invest now than in the future
o The discount rate is always higher when you invest in the future than now
o The money you have now is worth less today than an identical amount you would
receive in the future
o The money you have now is worth more today than an identical amount you
would receive in the future
2. The formula for calculating future value (FV) is*
o FV = PV/(1+r)^n
o FV = PV/(1+r)*n
o FV = PV x (1+r)^n
o FV = PV x (1+r)*n
3. If you were able to earn interest at 3% and you started with $100, how much would
you have after 3 years?*
o $91.51
o $109.27
o $291.26
o $103.00
4. Based on the numbers given below, calculate the net present value (NPV) of this
project.*
o 59.06
o 459.47
o 230.00
o 205.36
5. What is an annuity?*
o An investment that has no definite end and a stream of cash payments that
continues forever
o A stream of cash flows that start one year from today and continue while growing
by a constant growth rate
o A series of equal payments at equal time periods and guaranteed for a fixed
number of years
o A series of unequal payments at equal time periods which are guaranteed for a
fixed number of years
6. Calculate the price of a dividend paying stock using the following information,
assuming the price is equal to the present value of all future dividends one will receive
from owning the stock. (Hint: treat the stock as a growing perpetuity)*
o $37.50
o $32.14
o $42.60
o $45.00
7. What is a par value of a bond?*
o The amount borrowed by the issuer of the bond and returned to the investors
when the bond matures
o The overall return earned by the bond investor when the bond matures
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The difference between the amount borrowed by the issuer of bond and the
amount returned to investors at maturity
o The size of the coupon investors receive on an annual basis
8. When the price of a bond is above the face value, the bond is said to be*
o Trading at par
o Trading at a premium
o Trading at a discount
o Trading below par
9. Which of the following is true when a bond is trading at a discount?*
o Coupon Rate > Current Yield > Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate < Current Yield < Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate = Current Yield = Yield to Maturity
o Coupon Rate < Current Yield = Yield to Maturity
10. The concept of time value of money is that*
o The cash flows that occur earlier are more valuable than cash flows that occur
later
o The cash flows that occur earlier are less valuable than cash flows that occur later
o The longer the time cash flows are invested, the more valuable they are in the
future
o The future value of cash flows are always higher than the present value of the
cash flows
11. What is the enterprise value of a business?*
o The market value of equity of the business
o The book value of equity of the business
o The entire value of the business without giving consideration to its capital
structure
o The entire value of the business considering its capital structure
12. Which of the following is the formula to calculate cost of capital?*
o Total assets/Net debt x Cost of debt + Total assets/Equity x Cost of equity
o Net debt/Equity x Cost of debt + Equity/Net debt x Cost of equity
o Net debt x Cost of debt + Equity x Cost of equity
o Net debt/Total assets x Cost of debt + Equity/Total assets x Cost of equity
13. Company A has a capital structure of $80M debt and $20M equity. This year, the
company reported a net income of $17M. What is Company A's return on equity?*
o 117.6%
o 21.3%
o 85.0%
o 28.3%
14. Which of the following is not an investment grade credit rating?*
o BB+
o BBB+
o BBB
o BBB15. Which of the following is not true about private equity funds?*
o Private equity funds are pools of capital invested in companies which represent an
opportunity for high rate of return
o

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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Exit strategies for private equity funds include Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and
leveraged buyout (LBO)
o Venture capital is an example of private equity funds
o Private equity funds are usually invested for unlimited time periods
16. ____ underwriting commitment is when the underwriter agrees to buy the entire issue
and assume full financial responsibility for any unsold shares.*
o Best efforts
o Firm commitment
o All-or-none
o Full-purchase
17. The correct order of capital stack from the most to least secured is*
o Equity > Subordinated debt > Senior debt
o Subordinated debt > Senior debt > Equity
o Senior debt > Subordinated debt > Equity
o Senior debt > Equity > Subordinated debt
18. Which of the following is not a financing activity?*
o Repayment of long-term debt
o Issuance of equity
o Investments in businesses
o Payment of dividends
19. What is working capital?*
o Equity Capital + Retained Earnings
o Equity Capital - Total Liabilities
o Total Assets - Total Liabilities
o Current Assets - Current Liabilities
20. Which of the following is not true about goodwill?*
o Goodwill needs to be evaluated for impairment yearly
o Goodwill is treated as a tangible asset in accounting
o Goodwill is a result of purchasing a company for a price higher than the fair
market value of the target company's net assets
o Goodwill can be comprised of things such as good reputation, loyal client base,
and brand recognition
o

•

•

•

•

•
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Moderator’s Script for Game Theory Experiment Participants
Measures of Skill and Overconfidence (Step # I)
You (participants) will be asked to answer twenty (20) financial knowledge questions to
measure your skill level, which corresponds to the level of your financial knowledge. For each
question, you are asked to choose the correct answer from several alternatives. The financial
knowledge questionnaire is loaded on Qualtrics. Here is the link:
www.login.qualtrics.com/login. Login ID: Darryl.laws@pepperdine.edu Password:
password5432. Your responses and your scores will be stored on this platform. This test should
not take more than thirty minutes.
After making your choice for each question, the researcher will assign a probability that
the choice is correct (between 50% and 100%; both extremes are also allowed). A participant’s
average probability that you have correctly answered the questions corresponds to your
subjective confidence in your financial knowledge. This probability will be assigned by the
researcher. The researcher expected that the participants with higher confidence levels will
choose higher investment levels in Step # 2.
Table I: Number of Correct Answers and Skill Level
Number of correct answers

10 or less

12 or 13

14 or 15

50% <

70%+

80%+

90%+

1

2

3

Skill level

60%+

16 or 17

18 +

4

5

Investing (Step # II) From the onset of step 2, the participants estimated and reported their skill
level (Table I). The participants’ skill level was constant during step 2 and is defined only by the
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number of correct answers given in step 1. Half of the participants were not informed about their
performance in step 1. This control group was tasked with forming a guess about the number of
correct answers they gave and the resulting skill level without being told (Table 3).
Investment levels in Step 2. The basic tenets of the four (4) experiments included:
• In each transaction, the participant's potential reward depended on their respective
skillsets attained in Step I and the amount that they invested and the ROI derived from
it.
• The payoff was maximum when the participants made investment decisions that were
equal to their achieved skills level findings (Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017), (Holt and
Laury, 2002).
• Control group – 16 of the participants were told what the assessment of their
investment skills was in Step 1. The control group’s results were statistically
compared to the group that had been apprised of their skills level so as to validate
invalidated skills levels and tenets: overconfidence, lying for strategic advantage, and
co-operation versus non-cooperation.
• The non-control group’s decisions were solely based on their beliefs in their skills
level, having been advised of their scores in Step I. (n=16).
• Half of the participants (n=16) were designated as a control group and told of their
performance and their skill level in accordance with Table # 1. The control group is
shown Table # 2.
• Experiments – thirty-two (32) participants were assigned roles as either a buyer
(n=16) or a seller (n=16) of a private company in one of the four (4) acquisition
(investment) scenarios that the researcher predesigned.
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• Twenty-nine (29) participants engaged in one experiment one (1) time, and three (3)
participants engaged in a second experiment (game) with unique or different pairings.
• The participants were pseudo-randomly paired without either being aware of the
other’s skill level, work experience, and educational attainment.
• Each buyer (investor) was given an endowment of $5 million to invest in a chosen
transaction from four (4) experiments simulating various levels of risk and ROI.
•

The participants were told that they were allowed to “leverage up” senior debt (3:1) in
order to pursue a larger acquisition transaction.

•

Each seller was given the pre-money value of their company and the initial
capitalization so that they had a benchmark from which to negotiate a sale.

•

Coupled with # 9 above, participants were assigned a role to lie about certain facts or
to co-operate versus non co-operate in the negotiating process. (Basic Instructions pg.
148).

•

Each seller was given a company valuation to achieve on the sale of their company.

•

Similarly, each seller was assigned a role to act overconfident or to lie about certain
facts, or to co-operate / non co-operate in the negotiating process.

•

Participant’s objective - each participant was instructed that their objective was to
maximize their ROI through decision-making and interaction in negotiating while
exhibiting their inherent traits (via their assigned roles).

•

Levels of ROI were spread across each of the four experiments investment/acquisition
transactions simulating (a) a mediocre transaction, (b) a high risky transaction) a high
yield transaction, and (d) an acquisition of a company to be acquired for its synergies
without significant cash flow (i.e., risk avoidance).
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Basic Instructions to participants: The following instructions to the cohorts’
participants were posted on the Zoom platform home screen prior to each participant being
separated into a session for the respective simulated transaction/experiment. Essentially, the
instructions given them were (see Basic Instructions, p. 150):
•

You will be paired into groups of two; as a buyer (investor) or seller.

• You will be assigned separate roles, as either a buyer’s or seller’s perspectives and
objectives at the onset of the experiment. (The first person to draw a number from the
hat for paring is designated as the buyer.)
• Your role as a buyer or seller will not alternate in experiments. You will not be paired
with the same person if you participate in other experiments (transactions).
• In each experiment, you will have ninety (90) minutes to arrive at an outcome: an
agreed purchase price (purchase/sale), non-agreement, or some form of a compromise
agreement.
• Each of the thirty-two participants in the cohort will have a chance to participate in
one of the four experiments.
• The buyer (investor) will be given an endowment of $5 million to invest in each of the
experiments' simulated transactions with various levels of ROI.
• The buyers will be allowed to leverage (3:1, debt to equity) their purchases, buy stock
short and or long, and negotiate owner carried back financing.
• The cost of capital was factored into each participant’s ROI at 8% per annum
(accumulatively) (refer to experiment’s overview win Appendix).
• Coupled with this, the buyer/seller will be given a behavioral role of overconfidence
bias, or lie for strategic advantage or co-operate or non-cooperate, about certain facts
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in the negotiating process. (Note: These were assigned at the time in which the
investment choice the experiment was chosen by the buyer with the seller agreeing.)
• The researcher will monitor the experiments in addition to video recording them and
noting the behavior roles that may not be assigned but may manifest themselves in the
negotiation interaction. Note: In running the regression models, values will not be
imputed for the individuals' behavior in these instances. However, the causal variables
that were used by the respective participant will categorize that participants as having
exercised the respective behavior (causal variable).
•

The seller will be given a company valuation to achieve on the sale of their company.
Similarly, the seller will be assigned a role to co-operate or non-cooperate,
asymmetrical information, or lie about cert facts in the negotiating process.

•

Participant’s objective - each participant is to try to maximize your ROI through
negotiations while exhibiting their respective inherent traits coupled with those from
their assigned roles) of: asymmetrical information sharing, lying for strategic
advantage, and co-operate or not co-operate in the negotiations.

•

Levels of ROI are calculated on the one or the average of the two transactions
(experiment) in which you participated in.

•

The participants’ average ROI computation will be based on the one experiment in
which you achieved your best result.

•

Zoom call experiment timeline: 10 minutes for instructions at commencement, 90
minutes to negotiate, 10-15 minutes to debrief at the end of each game.

•

Each participant received a $100 Amazon gift card for proving the researcher their
time.
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•

The participant with the highest ROI amongst all experiments combined received a
$1,500 gift card.

Experiments - Simulated Acquisition/investment transaction (Step 2).
§ At the onset of step 2, half of the participants decided (perceived) on their personal
skills level. Their skill level was constant during the investment process in step 2 and
was defined only by the number of correct answers they gave on the financial
knowledge test in step 1 (Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017).
§ Fifty percent of participants were not told about their performance in the skills
assessment in step 1. However, these control group participants each formed a belief
about the number of correct answers they gave and the resulting skill level (Pikuina,
2017).
§ In the experimental task, the participants choose an investment level to maximize their
earnings in different investment transactions.
§ In each transaction, the participant’s earnings are equal to the realized revenues plus
their initial endowment.
§ The cost of the investment transaction depends on the negotiated level of the
acquisition price paid for the private company.
§ The players were allowed to leverage their respective acquisitions in each experiment.
§ The participants will interact with one another as a seller and buyer, each assimilating
a role assigned to them in the scenarios depicted below with each type of investment
transaction.
§ The researcher has developed a moderator’s script to instruct the participants and to
give them a thumbnail sketch of the experiments. (See Moderator’s Script).
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§ Each game theory experiment will be preceded by the researcher posting the
instructions to the participants on the Zoom screen for all participants to read.
§ These instructions to the participants will include the context of the game, the
participant’s respective roles, and the expectation of a negotiation position for the
buyer/seller in each experiment.
§ The researcher found an IT expert that had run virtual speeches and campaign
platforms for local candidates for the California State legislature and United States
Congress 2020 elections. The expert possessed a license with ZOOM for up to 100
participants on six computers. The IT expert-created six moderator accounts on each
on six different computers so that the researcher could run the experiments
concurrently while sitting in their facility, which has the necessary bandwidth to do so,
and monitor and moderate each experiment when necessary. The IT expert recorded
the experiments and stored them on the videos on three zip drives without accessing
the files. Once the files were downloaded, they were transferred to the zip drives in the
researcher’s presence. The recorded videos were transferred the same day the
experiments were conducted and in the researcher’s presence. At no time did the IT
expert of their team take control of the videos.
§ A test run was be conducted on December 15 2020, with a few persons in the
researcher's private equity fund's office to debug any flaws in the design and
implementation plan. However, the test run participants were not part of the study
experiments.
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The pairing of Participants for the Experiments
Participants were pseudo-randomly paired by pulling numbers out of a baseball hat at the
onset of each round of experiments conducted in December 2020 and January and February
2021.
M&A transactions for a private company investment overview. The four basic
transactions simulated acquisition/investment transactions were each designed with different
degrees of risk and ROI and presented to the participants with the four embedded factors. To
guarantee an optimal investment choice level for each participant’s skills level, the revenue
function was constructed such that earnings = revenues + endowment - the cost of the investment
(Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017). Earnings were at the highest only when the chosen investment
level equals a participant’s actual skill level. Both underestimation and overestimation of one’s
skill can lead to sub-optimal investment selections (Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017). To
maximize earnings, participants with skill level 1 should choose investment level 1, subjects with
skill level 2 should choose investment level 2, and so on (Pikulina and Renneboog, 2017). The
context scenarios included bias and rational and irrational behaviors showing overconfidence,
lying for strategic advantage, and co-operation versus non-cooperation.
Experiment #1. Mediocre Investment Transaction Overview
A business associate of 20 years approaches you and asks you to acquire a controlling
stake of 60% of the shares in their private company for $5 million. The company has struggled
for 12 months during the COVID-19 economic slowdown. He wants to continue to run the
company as its CEO. Due to cash flow restraints, the company cannot ramp up the production of
its primary product, which has constant demand. The company will be valued at $80 million
post-licensing. The company averages net margins of 9% while its peers are attaining 14%. You
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know that he is an average businessman and you could install a CEO to run the company for you
more profitably. Apple’s worldwide sales for the iMac, which the IP would be incorporated into,
are $1.2 BN annually.
§ Scenario applied: Non-cooperation (inclusive of asymmetrical information sharing).
The sellers in this experiment were given written and verbal instructions prior to the
experiments to not cooperate, to misrepresent facts surrounding the tenets of the
transaction. Empirical observation via recorded videos confirmed that the participants
following or not following their instructions.
§ Cumulative additions. The buyer (investor) does not disclose: 1) that the fund does
not permit more than 20% of their fund size to be allocated to one transaction and that
$5 million exceeds their mandate, 2) that he believes that he can convince their
managing partner of the PE fund to provide the equity capital required to do the
transaction, 3) a friend in the Apple investment department has advised him of
Apple’s interest in licensing of the borrower’s company’s intellectual property and a
potential royalty stream of payments at 4% per annum after the IP has been
incorporated into the hardware of the new iMacs that are manufactured and sold by
distributors.
Prompts for the buyer:
§ An investor is conservative, greedy, and short-sighted when it comes to achieving the
mandate for deploying the fund’s capital. He wants to acquire the whole company
cheaply and squeeze the seller out by offering him some cash and an earn-out structure
that does not provide the seller any compensation until the buyer has recouped half of
their investment back in the first three years.
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Prompts for the Seller:
§ The private company owner, the borrower, knows that their company’s value will
increase to 16 X after Apple signs the license agreement and pays its’ initial licensing
fee. The licensing fee is $1.5 million, and the annual royalty stream payments are 4%.
The royalty is paid out in arrears annually, and the first payment is due in one (1) year.
§ The seller does not disclose: 1) that he is desperate because the banks will not lend
capital to the company so that he can launch the new product that their R&D
department has developed from its new intellectual property. The new IP has
significant profit potential. It attracted Apple’s interest in licensing it and
incorporating it into their new iMac at an industry trade show. A licensing deal with
the borrower’s company for intellectual property would result in a potential four
percent (4%) royalty stream of payments per annum after the IP has been incorporated
into Apple’s iMac then manufactured and sold to distributors.
Experiment #2. High-risk investment Transaction. This was not depicted as high risk
when given to the participants. It was denoted simply as investment #2. An oilman approaches
you seeking an investment of $5 million for a 25% working interest in an oil field with proven
reserves and operating wells. The company’s six oil wells are producing 1,500 barrels of oil per
day total. The oilman’s overhead is 18% of revenue from the oilfield. The company’s annual
sales are $45 million. Currently, the oil market is flooded with an excessive oil supply, and there
is no storage available for the surplus commodity. Due to this oversupply, the selling price of a
barrel of oil is constant at $45 a barrel (West Texas Intermediate pricing). There is a potential
war occurring in Armenia. A peace accord in Iraq has not been reached, and Iran’s oil is
prohibited from being sold in international markets due to U.S. sanctions. The cost of storage of
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oil is estimated to be .55 cents per barrel per month. The company currently has 500,000 barrels
in storage. Transportation to market costs $1.50 per barrel. Their extraction cost is $13 per
barrel.
The company’s revenues and output are affected by erratic shocks due to wars, politics,
and the country's domestic economy in which the oil is extracted. These shocks do not depend on
a manager’s skill and cannot be predicted. These shocks of spikes can cause erratic swings in
market values of: -1.50, -1.40, -1.30, -1.20, -1.10, 0, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, 1.40, or 1.50 dollars per
barrel with equal probability. Their extraction cost is $13.00 per barrel.
Scenario applied: Lying for strategic advantage.
§ Prompt - Buyer: Lying for strategic advantage drive the buyer's motivation. The
buyers in this experiment were given written and verbal instructions in the breakout
sessions prior to the experiments to lie for advantage about material facts surrounding
the tenets of the transaction in order to observer whether or not it impacted the
premium price paid for the privately held company. Empirical observation via
recorded videos confirmed that the participants followed or not follow their
instructions.
§ Prompt - Seller: Fein cooperation. The seller knows a refiner who will refine their oil
more cheaply per barrel than other refiners but does not disclose this. The seller wants
to retain the savings between the cheaper refinery and the typical market cost to refine
the oil.
Experiment #3. High Yield Acquisition Transaction. This transaction was not depicted
as a high-yield investment transaction when described to the participants. The transaction was
denoted as investment # 3.
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To provide participants with stronger investment incentives, the researcher introduced an
investment transaction called the high yield transaction. In this investment transaction, their
economic payoff depended on their investment amount in their respective investment choice
(risk level) and skills shown and paying the right price resulting from their negotiations in step 1.
(Valuation metrics were embodied in the content of each experiment / transaction that enabled
the participants to calculate a plausible purchase price.) The participants’ economic payoff was
maximized when they made investment decisions congruent with their actual skill level (see
Table 3).
Investment Transaction. Desmond has entered into a purchase agreement to acquire six
(6) existing Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Dallas, Texas, with a revenue run rate of $28
million annually and an EBITDA of $5.1 million in 2019. The restaurants' revenues are up to
$50,000 year over year as of June 2020. He is arranging the company’s equity capital stack and
requires an additional $5 million of equity. Desmond is willing to pay an 8% hurdle rate
(preferred return) on the capital invested quarterly in arrears to secure a private equity investor.
He is offering 20% equity ownership of the company’s common shares. At the end of five (5)
years, he expects to drive revenues up to $75 million with a $9.3 million “Trailing Twelve
Months” (TTM) EBITDA. He intends to sell the asset at a multiple of 6 x TTM EBITDA at that
time. Note: he has cash on hand of $250,000 and an inventory of $450,000. There are no soft
drink company rebates available from Coca-Cola. The rent factor is 6% of the company’s gross
sales, and the G & A cost is 3.5% of the gross sales.
§ Scenario applied: Lying for strategic advantage by the seller and noncooperation.
The buyers in this experiment were given written and verbal instructions in the
breakout sessions prior to the experiments whether or not to cooperate or to not
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cooperate about material facts surrounding the tenets of the transaction in order to
observer whether or not it impacted the premium price paid for the privately held
company. Empirical observation via recorded videos confirmed that the participants
following or not following their instructions.
§ The PE fund manager (buyer) is an astute and experienced business investor. ROI
yield on investment and safety and security of the investment drives his motivation.
§ Both the buyer and seller are informed and realize that they may have to compromise;
however, not beyond the reach of their expected best prices.
§ Prompt- seller: The private company seller is cooperative but cautious.
§ Prompt – buyer: The buyer is confident that he can acquire more than 35% of the
company and a seat on the Board of Directors to protect their investment via voting
control of the company.
Experiment #4. Cash Preservation (Loss Aversion) Transaction. An acquisition for
synergies with no cash flow. Some of the participants, specifically family office-fund managers
are loss averse and set a maximum investment threshold on their initial endowment of $5
million. In this case, while making their investment choice of risk, their conservative judgement
of their skill level and their personal confidence in their ability impacts their choice of risk taken
and they choose to deploy a marginal amount of the endowment capital in what they perceive to
be a non-risk investment choice. This preservation of capital transaction provided participants
with identical incentives so that the researcher could assess their appropriate skill level
irrespective of their actual or believed skill level and determine their loss aversion perspective. In
this investment transaction, the costs of the investment level are the same for each participant.
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Investment Transaction. Your broker calls you and tells you an institutional block of
2,000,000 shares held by a pension fund that invested in Netflix’s stock because its revenues are
going through the ceiling from subscription revenues during the stay-at-home regulations for
COVID-19. You ask yourself, “How many shares do you buy if they are selling at $100 shares?”
In the meantime, the Netflix stock price splits and increases to $300 per share during the
first thirty days that you own the publicly traded shares. Your broker tells you to hold the stock
as their analysis indicates that it should be held longer for a much larger profit.
§ COVID-19 cases start to decrease, and people are returning to work and school. Do
you hold the stock or sell?
§ Scenario applied: Cautious, careful, risk avoidance of loss. The buyers in this
experiment were given written and verbal instructions in the breakout sessions prior to
the experiments how to avoid taking risk and to be cautious of how the seller
communicated material facts surrounding the tenets of the transaction in order to
observer whether or not it impacted the premium price paid for the privately held
company. Empirical observation via recorded videos confirmed that the participants
following or not following their instructions.
§ Prompt – seller: The seller is compelled as a public company to make full disclosure
- symmetrical information but not cooperative in making disclosing all of the facts.
§ Prompt – buyer: Lying for strategic advantage. He does not have the liquidity to
acquire the block of shares but wants to buy them. He may have to borrow from the
broker-dealer, but he does not want the broker to know.
1. Player’s roles defined:
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§ The buyer is driven by the rapid appreciation in Netflix’s stock value and the ability
to quickly dispose of the shares if the pandemic outlook significantly changes after a
vaccine is approved and turns a quick profit. The private equity buyer has three friends
who are mutual fund managers whose respective funds own 12% of the shares in the
market. He knows that he can buy their shares in street names without filing a form
13-D disclosing their holdings. This would position him to either conduct a hostile
takeover or arbitrage the shares.
§ However, Netflix has attained a multi-billion dollars market capitalization in the past
twelve months. It is in dire need of new management and human infra-structuring to
continue its value trajectory.
§ Seller: Because of its poor management regime, there is minimum cooperation
afforded investors who seek more information.
2. Prompt for buyer and seller:
§ The broker-dealer has noted that the buyer has been slow to repay the firm in the past
when he has shorted stock and that most likely he will require the buyer to leave the
shares in street name on the firm’s books during the holding period so the brokerdealer may liquidate them in the event the buyer cannot repay.
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APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1. Agency - An agency relationship is defined as a condition under which one or more owners
or private equity fund managers, (the principal(s), engage a manager (the agent) to perform a
service on their behalf which involves delegating decision-making authority to the agent.
2. Asymmetrical information. the unequal distribution of information between a buyer and
seller in a merger or acquisition transaction.
3. The axiomatic game theory approach is depicted by the co-operative approach amongst the
players.
4. Behavioral biases. Behavioral bias can explain by an example of a fund manager who
sincerely believes that an acquisition or merger is in the best interests of their stockholders or
in later case limited partner investors but that their belief is not rationally based.
5. Behavioral economics – the operating assumption of behavioral economics is that cognitive
biases often prevent people from making rational decisions, despite their best efforts (Ariely,
2009).
6. Better-than-Average. When individuals assess their relative skill, they tend to overestimate
their acumen relative to their peers (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977). Belief that the decisionmaker is more intelligent than others (Deavees et al, 2009).
7. Bounded rationality decision making is defined as when individuals make decisions their
rationality is limited by the tractability of the problem and the cognitive limitations of their
mind.
8. CBO score is the difference between a participant’s average confidence in their responses and
the actual reported number of correct answers to the 20-question financial knowledge test.
Overconfidence occurs when one's belief in one's ability exceeds reality. Studies that compare
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average confidence to average success rates are called calibration studies. A person is deemed
“well calibrated” if, over a large set of trials, his or her average confidence rating is equal to
his or her success rate.
9. Cognitive bias is a phenomenon underlying irrational decisions, which is a mistake in
reasoning, evaluating, remembering, or other cognitive processes. Cognitive bias often
results from maintaining personal preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary information.
10. Co-operation. The deviation from self-interest where individuals show regard for others
well-being, fairness principles, or a general willingness to empathize. Communication
collusion in resolving a coordinated problem. Example: the free and openly sharing of
transaction information between buyers and sellers as such that equilibrium is achieved in
expectation and economic outcome. In this instance co-operation is a nominal behavioral
action.
11. Deception. any distortion of or withholding of fact with the purpose of misleading others.
For example, a researcher who has not disclosed the true purpose of an experiment to a
participant has engaged in deception.
12. Equilibrium. is defined as a combination of decision rules or strategies, one for each
decision maker or player, in which each player’s strategy maximizes their personal expected
utility or payoff given the strategies of others who are deciding in the same way.
13. Escalation of commitment / a.k.a. sunk cost fallacy. Escalation of commitment refers to
the psychological condition whereby people continue to support or believe in something that
is repetitively failing (Dhir and Mital, 2012).
14. Fund manager’s overconfidence. From a practitioner’s perspective overconfidence is
typically defined as an executive’s exaggerated self-confidence or pride (Dhir and Mital,
2012).
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15. Irrational – The American Psychology Association the state, condition, or quality of lacking
rational thought. The term is typically used in relation to cognitive behavior, e.g., thinking,
decision making that is illogical or delusional. In psychology the phenomenon that causes
irrational decisions is called cognitive bias, which a mistake in reasoning, evaluating,
remembering, or other cognitive process, often occurring as a result of holding onto one's
preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary information.
16. Lying - Dan Ariely, a behavioral economist at Duke University, in books Predictably
Irrational and the (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty, makes the case that we are all probably
both. He states that in general, anything that causes emotion — sexual arousal, or hunger, or
anger, or compassion — can lead to irrational behavior. Emotions are inherently nonrational.
The reasons we lie boil down to two principal objectives: to prevent something we find
undesirable from happening or to help us secure something we find desirable but anticipate
we won’t succeed in getting if we’re honest about things. Crawford, (2001) posited that
lying for strategic advantage about planned actions, or intentions, is a common feature of
economic and political as well as military life. Such lying frequently takes the form of
active misrepresentation, as opposed to less than full, honest disclosure.
17. Non-cooperation. During binary economic events with financial stakes an individual
maintains his personal self-interest above other individuals without showing regard for others
well-being, disavowing fairness principles and exhibiting complete general unwillingness to
empathize.
18. Overconfidence- Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to consider themselves
above average on positive characteristics (Kruger, 1999; Alicke, 2005). Overconfident
decisions often indicate a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one’s own
competence or capabilities, especially when the person exhibiting it is in a position of power.
The difference between the participant’s belief in their competence abilities in mergers and
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acquisitions negotiations, their experience, and their actual competency (performance = ROI
on investment or over / under paid for the purchase of the private company).
19. Premium price. The acquisition or merger premium for a publicly traded company is
defined as the difference between the offer price and the market price of a target company
after the announcement of the transaction. Whereas the acquisition premium of a privately
held company is the difference between the estimated real value of a company and the actual
price paid for it. Premium prices paid (overpayment) were assessed by using researching
Business Valuation Resources and Pratt’s business valuation publications for (private and
public) companies sold for the last five years.
20. Rational behavior is often explicitly defined as analytical, logical and conscious (Dane et
al. 2011; Dane and Pratt 2007; Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994; Epstein 1994; Evans 2010;
Kaufmann et al. 2014; Reber et al. 2007).
21. Strategic dominant game theory approach model depicts outcomes in a non-co-operative
game in a merger or acquisition transaction. The strategic dominant game strategy is simply
the lack of cooperation in sharing information that is vital to the decision-making in an
interaction in which the dominant player possess the information that gives him an
advantage.
22. Zero sum or non-cooperative game is a game in which there is only one winner such as in
football.
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APPENDIX D: EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
Quantitative research is generally empirical in nature; it relies upon observation and in some cases,
experimentation. Quantitative research is usually highly structured, with results which have
numerical values. Quantitative research is empirical research where the data are in the form of
numbers. These results can be compared with other number-based results.
Empirical evidence is primarily obtained through observation during experimentation. The
observations or experiments are known as primary sources. Observational research can help us
understand more about causal associations between treatments and outcomes and more about the
world in general. These non-interventional studies have become valuable tools in because they
offer broad ways to answer real-world clinical research and product usage questions.
Onwuegbuzie, Burke and Colling (2009) provide a philosophical justification for analyzing
qualitative and quantitative data within the same study. First, they presented several recent
typologies of analyses in science research that incorporate both mono-methods (i.e. purely
quantitative research or purely qualitative research) and mixed research studies. Second, they
discuss what has been referred to as the fundamental principle of empirical data analysis, wherein
both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques are shaped by an attempt to analyze data
in a way that yields at least one of five types of generalizations.
Via my experiments simulating acquisitions transactions I was able to investigate one-off
profit maximization occurrence amongst private equity and family office fund managers as well
as investment bankers and SEC registered attorneys and by using make generalization solely to
the participants in my research study.
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